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Abstract
An identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme can greatly reduce the complexity of sending encrypted
messages overtheInternet. However,anIBE schemenecessarilyrequiresaprivate-keygenerator(PKG),
which can create private keys for clients, and so can passively eavesdrop on all encrypted communica-
tions. Although a distributed PKG has been suggested as a way to mitigate this problem for Boneh and
Franklin’s IBE scheme, the security of this distributed protocolhas not been provenand the proposedso-
lution does not work over the asynchronousInternet. Further, a distributed PKG has not been considered
for any other IBE scheme.
In this paper, we design distributed PKG setup and private key extraction protocols in an asyn-
chronous communication model for three important IBE schemes; namely, Boneh and Franklin’s IBE,
Sakai and Kasahara’s IBE, and Boneh and Boyen’s BB1-IBE. We give special attention to the applica-
bility of our protocols to all possible types of bilinear pairings and prove their IND-ID-CCA security in
the randomoracle model. Finally, we also performa comparativeanalysis of these protocols and present
recommendations for their use.
1 Introduction
In 1984, Shamir [60] introduced the notion of identity-based cryptography (IBC) as an approach to simplify
public-key and certiﬁcate management in a public-key infrastructure (PKI) and presented an open problem
to provide an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme. After seventeen years, Boneh and Franklin [10]
proposed the ﬁrst practical and secure IBE scheme (BF-IBE) using bilinear maps. After this seminal work,
in the last few years, signiﬁcant progress has been made in IBC (for details, refer a recent book on IBC [41]
and references therein).
In an IBC system, a client chooses an arbitrary string such as her e-mail address to be her public key.
Consequently, with a standardized public-key string format, an IBC scheme completely eliminates the need
for public-key certiﬁcates. As an example, in an IBE scheme, a sender can encrypt a message for a receiver
knowing just the identity of the receiver and importantly, without obtaining and verifying the receiver’s
public-key certiﬁcate. Naturally, in such a system, a client herself is not capable of generating a private key
for her identity. There is a trusted party called a private-key generator (PKG) which performs the system
setup, generates a secret called the master key and provides private keys to clients using it. As the PKG
computes a private key for a client, it can decrypt all of her messages passively. This inherent key escrow
property asks for complete trust in the PKG, which is difﬁcult to ﬁnd in many realistic scenarios.
1Need for the Distributed PKG. Importantly, the amount of trust placed in the holder of an IBC master
key is far greater than that placed in the holder of the private key of a certifying authority (CA) in a PKI. In
a PKI, in order to attack a client, the CA has to actively generate a fake certiﬁcate for the client containing a
fake public-key. In this case, it is often possible for the client to detect and prove the malicious behaviour of
the CA. The CA cannot perform any passive attack; speciﬁcally, it cannot decrypt a message encrypted for
the client using a client-generated public key and it cannot sign some document for the client, if the veriﬁer
gets a correct certiﬁcate from the client. On the other hand, in IBC,
• knowing the master key, the PKG can decrypt or sign the messages for any client, without any active
attack and consequent detection (key escrow),
• the PKG can make clients’ private keys public without any possible detection, and
• in a validity period-based key revocation system [10], bringing down the PKG is sufﬁcient to bring
the system to a complete halt (single point of failure), once the current validity period ends.
Therefore, the PKG in IBC needs to be far more trusted than the CA in a PKI. This has been considered as
a reason for the slow adoption of IBC schemes outside of closed organizational settings.
Boneh and Franklin [10] suggest distributing a PKG in their BF-IBE scheme to solve these problems. In
an (n,t)-distributed PKG, the master key is distributed among n PKG nodes such that a set of nodes of size
t or smaller cannot compute the master key, while a client extracts her private key by obtaining private-key
shares from any t + 1 or more nodes; she can then use the system’s public key to verify the correctness
of her thus-extracted key. Boneh and Franklin [10] propose veriﬁable secret sharing (VSS) of the master
key among multiple PKGs using Shamir secret sharing with a dealer [59] to design a distributed PKG and
also hint towards a completely distributed approach using the distributed (shared) key generation (DKG)
schemes of Gennaro et al. [33]; however, they do not provide a security proof. Further, none of the IBE
schemes deﬁned after [10] consider the design of a distributed PKG.
From a practicality standpoint, the DKG schemes [33] suggested in [10] to design a distributed PKG are
not advisable for use over the Internet. These DKG schemes are deﬁned for the synchronous communica-
tion model, having bounded message delivery delays and processor speeds, and do not provide safety (the
protocol does not fail or produce incorrect results) and liveness (the protocol eventually terminates) over the
asynchronous Internet, having no bounds on message transfer delays or processor speeds.
As a whole, although various proposed practical applications using IBE, such as key distribution in ad-
hoc networks [44], pairing-based onion routing [43] or veriﬁable random functions from identity-based key
encapsulation [1], require a distributed PKG as a fundamental need, there is no distributed PKG available for
use over the Internet yet. Deﬁning efﬁcient distributed PKGs for various IBE schemes which can correctly
function over the Internet has been an open problem for some time. This practical need for distributed PKGs
for IBC schemes that can function over the Internet forms the motivation of this work.
Contributions. Wepresent asynchronous distributed PKGsfor allthree important IBEframeworks: namely,
full-domain-hash IBEs, exponent-inversion IBEs and commutative-blinding IBEs [12]. We propose dis-
tributed PKG setups and distributed private-key extraction protocols for Boneh and Franklin’s BF-IBE [10],
Sakai and Kasahara’s SK-IBE [56], and Boneh and Boyen’s (modiﬁed) BB1-IBE [13, 12] schemes for use
over the Internet. The novelty of our protocols lies in achieving the secrecy of a client private key from
the generating PKG nodes without compromising the efﬁciency. We realize this with an appropriate use
of non-interactive proofs of knowledge, bilinear-pairing-based veriﬁcations and DKG protocols with and
without the uniform randomness property. In terms of feasibility, we ensure that our protocols work for all
three pairing types deﬁned by Galbraith et. al. [29].
2We prove adaptive chosen ciphertext security (IND-ID-CCA) security of the deﬁned three schemes in
the random oracle model. Interestingly, compared to the security proofs for the respective IBE schemes with
a single PKG, there are no additional security reduction factors in our proofs, even though the underlying
DKG protocol used in the distributed PKGs does not provide a guarantee about the uniform randomness
for the generated master secrets. To the best of our knowledge, there is no threshold cryptographic protocol
available in the literature where a similar tight security reduction has been proven while using a DKG
without the (more expensive) uniform randomness property.
Observing that a distributed (shared) key generator (DKG) is the single most important component of
distributed PKG, we implement a recently devised asynchronous DKG protocol [42] and demonstrate its
efﬁciency and reliability with extensive testing over the PlanetLab platform [54]. Finally, using operation
counts, key sizes, and possible pairing types, we compare the performance of the distributed PKGswe deﬁne
and also brieﬂy discuss the proactive security and group modiﬁcation primitives for them.
In §2, we compare various techniques suggested to solve the key escrow and single point of failure
problems in IBC. We also discuss previous work related to DKG protocols. In §3, we describe a realistic
asynchronous system model over the Internet and justify the choices made, while we deﬁne and describe
cryptographic tools in our model in §4. With this background, in §5, we deﬁne and prove distributed PKG
protocols for the BF-IBE, SK-IBE and BB1-IBE schemes. We then implement a practical DKG protocol,
and test its performance over the PlanetLab platform in §6. We also compare the IBE schemes based on
their distributed PKGs and touch upon proactive security and group modiﬁcation protocols for the system.
2 Related Work
We divide the related work into two parts. Distributed (shared) key generation is the most important com-
ponent for distributed private-key generation in identity-based cryptography. We ﬁrst discuss the existing
work towards distributed key generation. As designing distributed PKGs is our main goal in this work, we
concentrate on protocols in computational (as opposed to unconditional / information-theoretic) settings.
Although somewhat ignored, there have been some efforts to mitigate the single point of failure and the key
escrow issues in IBC systems; in the latter part of this section, we compare these alternatives with distributed
PKG.
Although we are deﬁning protocols for IBE schemes, as we are concentrating on distributed crypto-
graphic protocols and due to space constraints, we do not include a comprehensive account of IBE here.
We refer readers to [12] for a detailed discussion on the various IBE schemes and frameworks deﬁned in
the literature. Pursuant to this survey, we work in the random oracle model for efﬁciency and practicality
reasons.
Distributed Key Generation. The notion of secret sharing was introduced independently by Shamir [59]
and Blakley [7] in 1979. Since then, it has remained an important topic in security research. Signiﬁcantly,
Chor et al. [22] introduced veriﬁability in secret sharing. Feldman [25] developed the ﬁrst efﬁcient and non-
interactive VSS protocol and Pedersen [52] presented a modiﬁcation to it. However, these VSS are deﬁned
assuming a synchronous communication model. For an asynchronous communication model, Cachin et
al. (AVSS) [14], Zhou et al. (APSS) [64], and Schultz et al. (MPSS) [58] deﬁned VSS schemes in the
computational setting. Of these, the APSS protocol is impractical for any reasonable system size, as it
has an exponential
￿n
t
￿
factor in the message complexity (number of messages transferred), while MPSS is
developed for a more mobile setting where set of the system nodes has to change completely between two
consecutive phases. AVSS by Cachin et al. with its seemingly optimal communication complexity (number
of bits transferred) is certainly a suitable choice for a distributed PKG system.
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node runs a variation of Feldman’s VSS and distributed shares are added at the end to generate a combined
shared secret without a dealer. Gennaro et al. [33] presented a simpliﬁcation using just the original Feldman
VSS called the Joint Feldman DKG (JF-DKG). Further, they found that DKGs based on the Feldman VSS
(or using Feldmancommitments [25]) donot guarantee uniformly random secret keys and deﬁne anew DKG
combining Feldman and Pedersen commitments [53]which increases the latency (number ofcommunication
rounds) by one. However, in [34], they observed that DKGs based on Feldman commitments produce hard
instances of discrete logarithm problems (DLPs), which may be sufﬁcient for the security of some threshold
cryptographic schemes.
Tothe best ofour knowledge, the ﬁrst DKGscheme in an asynchronous setting was only deﬁned recently
by Kate and Goldberg [42]. This protocol modiﬁes the AVSS protocol to a more realistic hybrid model and
performs leader-based agreement with a leader-changing mechanism to decide which of the nodes’ VSS
will be included in the DKG calculation; that is, whereas in synchronous DKG schemes such as Pedersen’s
above, all of the successful VSSs can be added at the end of the protocol to determine the ﬁnal master key
shares, in the asynchronous setting, some global consensus must be reached in order to ﬁnd a sufﬁciently
large set of VSSs which all honest nodes have completed. We implement this DKG protocol and verify its
efﬁciency and reliability. Consequently, this DKG system forms the basis of our distributed PKG protocols.
The original asynchronous DKG protocol uses Feldman commitments and consequently does not guarantee
uniform randomness ofthekey. However, weobserve that, intherandom oracle model, using non-interactive
zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge based on the Fiat-Shamir methodology [26], if required, it is possible
to achieve uniform randomness in their scheme. In such a scheme, Feldman commitments are initially
replaced byPedersen commitments; the Feldman commitments are introduced only atthe end ofthe protocol
to obtain the required private key. The zero-knowledge proofs are used to show that the Feldman and
Pedersen commitments both commit to the same values.
All of the above schemes are proved secure only against a static adversary, which can only choose its t
compromisable nodes before a protocol run. They are not considered secure against an adaptive adversary
because their simulation-based security proofs do not go through when the adversary can corrupt nodes
adaptively.[35, §4.4] Feldman claimed [25, §9.3] that his VSS protocol is also secure against adaptive ad-
versaries even though his simulation-based security proof did not work out. Canetti et al. [16] presented a
scheme provably secure against adaptive adversaries with at least two more communication rounds as com-
pared to JF-DKG and with interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Due to the inefﬁciency of adaptive (provably)
secure DKG protocols, we stick to protocols provably secure only against a static adversary, though they
have remained unattacked by an adaptive adversary for the last 22 years.
Alternatives toa Distributed PKG. None ofthe IBEschemes except BF-IBEconsidered distributed PKG
setup and key extraction protocols in their design. Recently, Geisler and Smart [32] deﬁned a distributed
PKG for Sakai and Kasahara’s SK-IBE [56]; however, their solution against a Byzantine adversary has an
exponential communication complexity and a formal security proof is also not provided. We overcome both
of these barriers in our distributed PKG for SK-IBE: our scheme is secure against a Byzantine adversary
and has the same polynomial-time communication complexity as their scheme, which is secure only against
an honest-but-curious adversary; we also provide a formal security proof.
Other than [32], there have been a few other efforts in the literature to counter the inherent key escrow
and single point of failure issues in IBE. Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] introduce certiﬁcateless public-key
cryptography (CL-PKC) to address the key escrow problem by combining IBC with public-key cryptogra-
phy. Their elegant approach, however, does not address the single point of failure problem. Although it is
possible to solve the problem by distributing their PKG using a VSS (which employs a trusted dealer to gen-
erate and distribute the key shares), which is inherently cheaper than a DKG-based PKG by a linear factor, it
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as private-key extractions are less frequent than encryptions, it is certainly advisable to use more efﬁcient
options during encryption rather than private-key extraction. Finally, with the requirement of online access
to the receiver’s public key, CL-PKC becomes ineffective for systems without continuous network access,
where IBC is considered to be an important tool. Lee et al. [46] and Gangishetti et al. [31] propose variants
of the distributed PKG involving a more trustworthy key generation centre (KGC) and other key privacy au-
thorities (KPAs). As observed by Chunxiang et al. [23] for [46], these approaches are, in general, vulnerable
to passive attack by the KGC. In addition, the trust guarantees required by a KGC can be unattainable in
practice. Goyal [37] reduces the required trust in the PKG by restricting its ability to distribute a client’s pri-
vate key. This does not solve the problem of single point of failure. Further, the PKG in his system still can
decrypt the clients’ messages passively, which leaves a secure and practical implementation of distributed
PKGs wanting.
Threshold versions of signature schemes obtained from some IBE schemes using the Naor transform
have been proposed and proved previously [8, 61]. However, these solutions do not work for the corre-
sponding IBE scheme. This is due to the inherent secret nature of a client’s private keys and corresponding
shares as compared to the inherent public nature of signatures and corresponding signature shares. While
designing IBE schemes with a distributed PKG, we have to make sure that a PKG node cannot derive more
information than the private-key share it generates for a client and that private-key shares are not available
in public as commitments.
3 System Model and Assumptions
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the assumptions and the system model for our distributed PKG system,
giving special attention to its practicality over the Internet. We follow the system model of [42], which
closely depicts the Internet, and as their DKG forms the basis of our distributed PKGs.
3.1 Communication Model
In the theoretical sense, distributed protocols designed with a synchronous or a partially synchronous
(bounded message delivery delays and processor speeds, but the bounds are unknown and eventual [24])
communication assumption tend to be more efﬁcient in terms of latency and message complexity than their
counterparts designed with an asynchronous communication assumption. However, protocols deﬁned in
the synchronous or partially synchronous communication model invariably use some time bounds in their
deﬁnition. An adversary, knowing those bounds, may slow down the protocol by appropriately delaying its
messages, which makes deciding the time bounds correctly a difﬁcult problem to solve. On the other hand,
protocols deﬁned for the asynchronous communication model use only numbers and types of messages and
guarantee to ﬁnish quickly with only honest nodes communicating promptly. Therefore, we assume an
asynchronous communication model.
Weak Synchrony (only for liveness). Generating true randomness in a completely distributed (dealerless)
asynchronous setting efﬁciently, without using a DKG, although not impossible [17], is a difﬁcult task to
perform; the known computational threshold coin-tossing algorithms [15] require a dealer or a synchronous
communications assumption. As observed in [42], asynchronous DKG requires a protocol to solve the
agreement on a set problem [5], which needs distributed randomness or a synchrony assumption [27]. In
the absence of an efﬁcient randomization procedure, [42] uses a weak synchrony assumption by Castro and
Liskov [18] for liveness, but not safety. According to this assumption, a function delay(t), deﬁning the
message transmission delay of a message sent at time t, does not grow faster than t indeﬁnitely. Assuming
5that network faults are eventually repaired and DoS attacks eventually stop, this assumption is valid in
practice. We further discuss this assumption in §6.1.
3.2 Hybrid Adversary Model
Instead of using a standard t-Byzantine adversary in a system with n nodes P1,P2,...,Pn, we use a hy-
brid adversary introduced in [3], having another f non-Byzantine crashes, and modiﬁed in [42] to include
network link failures.
For the standard t-Byzantine adversary, t nodes compromised or crashed by the adversary remain com-
promised forever. Thisdoes not depict theadversary model over theInternet accurately. Along witharbitrary
behaviour by t Byzantine nodes, some nodes can just crash silently without showing malicious behaviour
or just get disconnected from the system due to network failure or partitioning. As the adversary does not
capture these f nodes or their secret parameters, it is not computationally and communicationally optimal to
consider these nodes as Byzantine. It also gives rise to a sub-optimal resilience of n ≥ 3(t + f)+ 1 instead
of the n ≥ 3t + 2f + 1 bound effected by treating crashes and link failures separately from the Byzantine
adversary.
In this hybrid adversary model, crashes and link failures belong to the same set of f nodes, as from
a perspective of any other node of the system a crashed node behaves exactly same as a node whose link
with it is broken. We recover secrets at these f nodes immediately after their trusted rebooting, which
gives us the assumption that all non-Byzantine nodes may crash and recover repeatedly with a maximum f
crashed nodes at any instant. If two nodes cannot communicate, then we treat at least one of two nodes as
being either Byzantine or one of the currently crashed nodes. That is, following the standard asynchronous
communication model literature, we assume that the adversary controls the network, but faithfully delivers
all the messages between two honest uncrashed nodes.
3.3 Cryptographic Background
Bilinear Pairings. IBC extensively utilizes bilinear pairings over elliptic curves. For three cyclic groups
G, ˆ G, and GT (all of which we shall write multiplicatively) of the same prime order p, a bilinear pairing e
is a map e : G × ˆ G → GT with following properties.
• Bilinearity: For g ∈ G, ˆ g ∈ ˆ G and a,b ∈ Zp, e(ga,ˆ gb) = e(g, ˆ g)ab.
• Non-degeneracy: The map does not send all pairs in G × ˆ G to unity in GT.
If there is an efﬁcient algorithm to compute e(g, ˆ g) for any g ∈ G and ˆ g ∈ ˆ G, the pairing e is called
admissible. We also expect that it is not feasible to invert a pairing and come back to G or ˆ G. All pairings
considered in this paper are admissible and infeasible to invert. We call such groups G and ˆ G pairing-
friendly groups. We refer readers to [6, Chap. IX and X] for a detailed mathematical discussion of bilinear
pairings.
Following [29], we consider three types of pairings for prime order groups: namely, type 1, 2, and 3. In
type 1 pairings, an isomorphism φ : ˆ G → G as well as its inverse φ−1 are efﬁciently computable. These are
also called symmetric pairings as for such pairings e(g, ˆ g) = e(φ(ˆ g),φ−1(g)) for any g ∈ G and ˆ g ∈ ˆ G,
and we usually just identify G with ˆ G in this case. In type 2 pairings, only the isomorphism φ, but not
φ−1, is efﬁciently computable. Finally in type 3 pairings, neither of φ nor φ−1 can be efﬁciently computed.
The efﬁciency of the pairing computation improves from type 1 to type 2 to type 3 pairings. For a detailed
discussion of the performance aspects of pairings we refer the reader to [29, 19].
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framework. Further, our adversary is computationally bounded with a security parameter κ. We assume an
instance of a pairing infrastructure of multiplicative groups G, ˆ G and GT, whose common order p is a κ-bit
prime. For commitments and proofs of knowledge, we use the discrete logarithm (DLog) [49, Chap. 3]
assumption.
We assume an instance of a pairing infrastructure of multiplicative groups G, ˆ G and GT, whose common
order p is such that the adversary has to perform 2κ operations to break the system. For the security of the
IBE schemes, we use the bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman (BDH) [38] and bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman inversion (BDHI)
[50, 9] assumptions. Here, we recall the deﬁnitions of generic versions (for asymmetric pairings) of these
two assumptions from [12]. Note that a function ǫ( ) is called negligible if for all c > 0 there exists a κ0
such that ǫ(κ) < 1/κc for all κ > κ0.
BDH Assumption: Given a tuple (g, ˆ g,ga,ˆ ga,gb,ˆ gc) in a bilinear group G =  e,G, ˆ G,GT , the BDH
problem is a problem to compute e(g, ˆ g)abc. The BDH assumption then states that it is infeasible to solve a
random instance of the BDH problem, with non-negligible probability, in time polynomial in the size of the
problem instance description.
BDHI Assumption: Given two tuples (g,gx,g(x2),...,g(xq)) and (ˆ g, ˆ gx, ˆ g(x2),..., ˆ g(xq)) in a bilinear
group G =  e,G, ˆ G,GT , the q-BDHI problem is a problem to compute e(g, ˆ g)1/x. The BDHI assumption
for some polynomially bounded q states that it is infeasible to solve a random instance of the q-BDHI
problem, with non-negligible probability, in time polynomial in the size of the problem instance description.
4 Cryptographic Tools
In this section, we describe important cryptographic tools required to design distributed PKGs in the hybrid
model having an asynchronous network of n ≥ 3t + 2f + 1 nodes with a t-limited Byzantine adversary
and f-limited crashes and network failures. Note that these tools are also useful in other asynchronous
computational multiparty settings.
4.1 Homomorphic Commitments over Zp
A veriﬁcation mechanism for a consistent dealing is fundamental to VSS. It is achieved using distributed
computing techniques in the unconditional setting. In the computational setting, homomorphic commitments
provide an efﬁcient alternative. Let C(α,[r]) ∈ G be a homomorphic commitment to α ∈ Zp, where r is an
optional randomness parameter and G is a (multiplicative) group. For such a homomorphic commitment,
given C1 = C(α1,[r1]) and C2 = C(α2,[r2]), we have C1   C2 = C(α1 + α2,[r]).
VSS protocols utilize two forms of commitments. Let g and h be two random generators of G. Feld-
man, for his VSS protocol [25], used a commitment scheme of the form C g (α) = gα with computational
security under the DLog assumption and unconditional share integrity. Pedersen [53] presented another
commitment of the form C g,h (α,r) = gαhr with unconditional security but computational integrity under
the DLog assumption. In PKC based on computational assumptions, with adversarial access to the public
key, unconditional security of the secret (private key or master key) is impossible. Further, in VSS schemes
based on Pedersen commitments, in order to randomly select the generator h, an additional round of com-
munication is required during bootstrapping. Consequently, in our scheme, we use simple and efﬁcient
Feldman commitments, except during a special case described in the DKG discussion below.
In their VSSs, Feldman and Pedersen use commitments of coefﬁcients of shared polynomials. However,
following the computational multiparty computation protocol by Gennaro et al. [36] and AVSS by Cachin et
al. [14], weinstead use commitments of evaluations ofshared polynomials. Thisreduces the communication
complexity (the total bit length ofmessages exchanged) ofAVSSbyalinear factor and makes veriﬁcations of
shares’ products easier in the distributed multiplication protocol of [36]. To that end, we deﬁne the Feldman
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(s)
 g  = [gs,gϕ(1),    ,gϕ(n)] where ϕ is a randomly selected polynomial of degree tover
Zp with ϕ(0) = s. Similarly, the Pedersen commitment vector C
(s,s′)
 g,h  = [gshs′
,gϕ(1)hψ(1),    ,gϕ(n)hψ(n)]
where ϕ is as above, and ψ is similar, but with ψ(0) = s′. The jth element of a Feldman commitment vector
(counting from 0) will be denoted by
￿
C
(s)
 g 
￿
j
(and similarly for Pedersen commitment vectors).
4.2 Non-interactive Proofs of Knowledge
As we assume the random oracle model in this paper, we can use non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
of knowledge (NIZKPK) based on the Fiat-Shamir methodology [26]. In particular, we use a variant of
NIZKPK of a discrete logarithm and one for proof of equality of two discrete logarithms.
We employ a variant of NIZKPK of a discrete logarithm where given a Feldman commitment C g (s)
and a Pedersen commitment C g,h (s,r) for s,r ∈ Zp, a prover proves that she knows s and r such that
C g (s) = gs and C g,h (s,r) = gshr. That is, the prover proves that the Feldman commitment and the
Pedersen commitment are to the same value s. We denote this proof as
NIZKPK≡Com(s,r,C g (s),C g,h (s,r)) = π≡Com ∈ Z3
p. (1)
We describe it in detail in Appendix A; it is nearly equivalent to proving knowledge of two discrete loga-
rithms separately.
Wealso use another NIZKPK(proof of equality) of discrete logarithms [20]such that given two Feldman
commitments C g (s) = gs and C h (s) = hs, a prover proves equality of the associated discrete logarithms.
We denote this proof as
NIZKPK≡DLog(s,C g (s),C h (s)) = π≡DLog ∈ Z2
p. (2)
and refer readers to Appendix A for details. Note that g and h can belong two different groups of the same
order.
There exists an easier way to prove this equality of discrete logarithms if a pairing between the groups
generated by g and h is available. Using a technique due to Joux and Nguyen [40] to solve the DDH problem
over pairing-friendly groups, given gx and hx′
the veriﬁer checks if e(g,hx′
)
? = e(gx,h). However, when
using a type 3 pairing, in the absence of an efﬁcient isomorphism between G and ˆ G, if both g and h belong
to the same group (say G without loss of generality), then the pairing-based veriﬁcation scheme does not
work. In such a situation, the above NIZKPK provides a less efﬁcient but completely practical alternative.
4.3 DKG over Zp
In an (n,t)-DKG protocol over Zp, a set of n nodes generates an element s ∈ Zp in a distributed fashion with
its shares si ∈ Zp spread over the n nodes such that any subset of size greater than a threshold t can reveal or
use the shared secret, while smaller subsets cannot. A DKG protocol consists of a sharing (DKG-Sh) phase
and a reconstruction (DKG-Rec) phase. In the DKG-Sh phase, a distributed secret s ∈ Zp is generated
among n nodes such that each node Pi holds a share si and a commitment vector C(s) of s and all of its
shares. During the DKG-Rec phase, each node Pi reveals its share si and reconstructs s using veriﬁed
revealed shares.
Deﬁnition 4.1. For our hybrid model having an asynchronous network of n ≥ 3t + 2f + 1 nodes with a
t-limited Byzantine adversary and f-limited crashes and network failures, We use a DKG protocol deﬁned
in [42] satisfying the following conditions:
8Liveness: Once protocol DKG-Sh starts, all honest ﬁnally up nodes complete the protocol, except with
negligible probability.
Agreement: If some honest node completes protocol DKG-Sh then, except with negligible probability, all
honest ﬁnally up nodes will eventually complete protocol DKG-Sh .
Correctness: Once an honest node completes protocol DKG-Sh then there exists a ﬁxed value s ∈ Zp
such that, if an honest node Pi reconstructs zi ∈ Zp during DKG-Rec, then zi = s.
Secrecy: If no honest node has started protocol DKG-Rec then, except with negligible probability, an
adversary cannot compute the shared secret s.
We assume that messages from all the honest and uncrashed nodes are delivered by the adversary.
A closer look at the secrecy property suggests that in the presence of anadversary, the shared secret in the
above DKG may not be uniformly random; this is a direct effect of using only Feldman commitments.[35,
§3] However, in many cases, we do not need a uniformly random secret key; the security of these schemes
relies on the assumption that the adversary cannot compute the secret. Most of the schemes in this paper
similarly only require the assumption that it is infeasible to compute the secret given public parameters and
we stick with Feldman commitments those cases. However, we do indeed need a uniformly random shared
secret in few protocols In that case, we use Pedersen commitments, but we do not employ the methodology
deﬁned by Gennaro et al. [35], which increases the latency in the system. We observe instead that with the
random oracle assumption at our disposal, the communicationally demanding technique by Gennaro et al.
can be replaced with the much simpler computational non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of equality of
committed values NIZKPK≡Com described in Eq. 1.
We represent DKG protocols using Feldman commitments and Pedersen commitments as DKGFeld
and DKGPed respectively. For node Pi, the corresponding DKG-Sh and DKG-Rec schemes are deﬁned as
follows.
￿
C
(s,s′)
 g,h  ,[C
(s)
 g ,NIZKPK≡Com],si,s′
i
￿
= DKG-ShPed(n,t,f,˜ t,g,h,αi,α′
i) (3)
￿
C
(s)
 g ,si
￿
= DKG-ShFeld(n,t,f,˜ t,g,αi) (4)
s = DKG-RecPed(t,C
(s,s′)
 g,h  ,si,s′
i) (5)
s = DKG-RecFeld(t,C
(s)
 g ,si) (6)
Here, ˜ t is the number of VSS instances to be chosen (t < ˜ t ≤ 2t+1), g,h ∈ G are commitment generators,
αi,α′
i ∈ Zp are respectively a secret and randomness shared by Pi, and C
(s)
 g  and C
(s,s′)
 g,h  are respectively the
Feldman and Pedersen commitment vectors described in §4.1. The optional NIZKPK≡Com is a vector of
zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge that the corresponding entries of C
(s)
 g  and C
(s,s′)
 g,h  commit to the same
values. (The polynomial ϕ for the two types of commitments will be the same in this case.) The liveness
and agreement proofs of DKG-ShPed are the same as those of DKG-ShFeld. In Appendix B, we prove the
correctness and secrecy properties of DKG-ShPed.
The worst-case message and communication complexities of protocol DKG-Sh [42] are O(tdn2(n+d))
and O(κtdn3(n + d)) respectively, while those of protocol DKG-Rec are O(n2) and O(κn2) respectively.
Here, the function d( ) bounds the number of crashes that the adversary is allowed to perform.
Distributed Random Sharing over Zp. This protocol generates shares of a secret z chosen jointly at
random from Zp. Every node generates a random ri ∈ Zp and shares that using the DKG-Sh protocol
9with Feldman or Pedersen commitments as DKG-Sh(n,t,f,˜ t = t+1,g,[h],ri,[r′
i]) where the generator h
and randomness r′
i are only required if Pedersen commitments are used. Liveness, agreement, correctness,
secrecy and message and communication complexities remain the same as those of the DKG-Sh protocol.
We represent the corresponding protocols as follows:
￿
C
(z)
 g ,zi
￿
= RandomFeld(n,t,f,g) (7)
￿
C
(z,z′)
 g,h  ,[C
(z)
 g ,NIZKPK≡Com],zi,z′
i
￿
= RandomPed(n,t,f,g,h). (8)
4.4 Distributed Addition over Zp
Let α,β ∈ Zp be two secrets shared among n nodes using the DKG-Sh protocol. Let polynomials
f(x),g(x) ∈ Zp[x] be the respectively associated degree-t polynomials and let c ∈ Zp be a non-zero
constant. Due to the linearity of Shamir’s secret sharing [59], a node Pi with shares αi and βi can locally
generate shares of α + β and cα by computing αi + βi and cαi, where f(x) + g(x) and cf(x) are the
respective polynomials. f(x) + g(x) is random if either one of f(x) or g(x) is, and cf(x) is random if
f(x) is. Commitment entries for the resultant shares respectively are
￿
C
(α+β)
 g 
￿
i
=
￿
C
(α)
 g 
￿
i
￿
C
(β)
 g 
￿
i
and
￿
C
(cα)
 g 
￿
i
=
￿
C
(α)
 g 
￿c
i
.
4.5 Distributed Multiplication over Zp
Unlike addition, local distributed multiplication of two shared secrets α and β looks unlikely. We use a
distributed multiplication protocol against a computational adversary by Gennaro et al. [36, §4]. However,
instead of their interactive zero-knowledge proof, we utilize a pairing-based DDH problem solving tech-
nique [40] to verify the correctness of the product value shared by a node non-interactively. For shares αi
and βi with Feldman commitments gαi and ˆ gβi, given a commitment gαiβi of the shared product, other
nodes can verify its correctness by checking if e(gαi, ˆ gβi)
? = e(gαiβi, ˆ g) provided the groups of g and ˆ g are
pairing-friendly. We observe that it is also possible to perform this veriﬁcation when one of the involved
commitments is a Pedersen commitment. However, if both commitments are Pedersen commitments, then
we have to compute Feldman commitments for one of the values and employ NIZKPK≡Com to prove its
correctness in addition to using the pairing-based veriﬁcation. In such a case, the choice between the latter
technique and the non-interactive version of zero-knowledge proof suggested by Gennaro et al. [36] depends
upon implementation efﬁciencies of the group operation and pairing computations.
In our IBC schemes, we always use the multiplication protocol with at least one Feldman commitment.
We denote the multiplication protocol involving two Feldman commitments as MulFeld and the one involv-
ing a combination of the two types of commitments as MulPed. Liveness and agreement properties are
exactly the same as those of DKG-Sh. For correctness, along with recoverability to a unique value (say s),
protocol Mul also requires that s = αβ. For secrecy, along with the secrecy of αβ until DKG-Rec is started,
the protocol should not provide any additional information about the individual values of α or β once αβ is
reconstructed.
￿
C
(αβ)
 g∗  ,(αβ)i
￿
= MulFeld(n,t,f,g∗,
￿
C
(α)
 g  ,αi
￿
,
￿
C
(β)
 ˆ g ,βi
￿
) (9)
￿
C
(αβ,αβ′)
 ˆ g,ˆ h  ,(αβ)i,(αβ′)i
￿
= MulPed(n,t,f, ˆ g,ˆ h,
￿
C
(α)
 g  ,αi
￿
,
￿
C
(β,β′)
 ˆ g,ˆ h  ,βi,β′
i
￿
) (10)
For MulFeld, g∗ = g or ˆ g. For MulPed, without loss of generality, we assume that β is distributed with the
Pedersen commitment. If instead α uses Pedersen commitment, then the Pedersen commitment groups for
(αβ) change to g and h instead of ˆ g and ˆ h.
10Brieﬂy, the protocol works as follows. Every honest node runs the DKG-Sh(n,t,f,˜ t = 2t + 1, ˆ g,[ˆ h],
αiβi,[αiβ′
i]) from Eq. 3 or 4. As discussed above, pairing-based DDH solving is used to verify that the
shared value is equal to the product of αi and βi.1 At the end of the DKG-Sh protocol, instead of adding the
subshares of the selected VSS instances, every node interpolates them at index 0 to get the new share (αβ)i
of αβ.
Analysis. Here, we roughly prove the properties of protocol Mul. This protocol is almost equivalent to the
share renewal protocol in [42, §5.2] which is a slight modiﬁcation of protocol DKG-Sh. The liveness and
agreement proofs are exactly the same as those of DKG-Sh [42, §4]. The basic correctness proof remains
the same as that of the share renewal protocol [42, §5.2] except the starting polynomial is of degree 2t + 1
here. On the other hand, the pairing-based DDH problem solving technique assures that the value shared
by a node Pi is equal to the product of its shares αi and βi. The basic secrecy proof is same as that of the
renewal protocol. Further, the adversary cannot determine α or β even after αβ is reconstructed as the ﬁnal
shared polynomial for αβ is independent of the shared polynomials for α and β individually. The message
and communication complexities are the same as those of the DKG protocol.
Asthedistributed addition can beperformed locally, the above Mulprotocols canbe seamlessly extended
for distributed computation of any expression having binary products. For ℓ shared secrets x1,x2,    ,xℓ,
and their corresponding Feldman commitments C
(x1)
 g  ,C
(x2)
 g  ,    ,C
(xℓ)
 g  , shares of any binary product x′ =
Pm
i=1 kixaixbi with known constants ki and indices ai,bi can be easily computed by extending the protocol
in Eq. 9. We denote this generalization as follows.
￿
C
(x′)
 g∗ ,x′
i
￿
= MulBP(n,t,f,g∗,{(ki,ai,bi)},
￿
C
(x1)
 g  ,(x1)i
￿
,
￿
C
(x2)
 g  ,(x2)i
￿
,    ,
￿
C
(xℓ)
 g  ,(xℓ)i
￿
) (11)
Node Pj shares
P
i ki(xai)j(xai)j. For a type 1 pairing, veriﬁcation of the correctness of the sharing is done
by other nodes as follows.
e(g
P
i ki(xai)j(xbi)j,g)
? =
Y
i
e((g(xai)j)ki,g(xbi)j)
For type 2 and 3 pairings, NIZKPK≡DLog is used to provide Feldman commitments to the (xbi)j with
generator ˆ g, and then a pairing computation like the above is used. We use the protocol in Eq. 11 during
distributed private-key extraction in the Boneh and Boyen’s BB1-IBE scheme in §5.5.
4.6 Sharing the Inverse of a Shared Secret
Given an (n,t,f)-distributed secret α, computing shares of its inverse α−1 in distributed manner (without
reconstructing α)can bedone trivially but inefﬁciently using adistributed computation ofαp−1; this involves
O(logp) distributed multiplications. However, using a technique by Bar-Ilan and Beaver [4], this can be
done using just one Random, one Mul and one DKG-Rec protocol.
This protocol involves a DKG-Rec which outputs the product of the shared secret α with a distributed
random element z. If z is created using Feldman commitments and is not uniformly random, the product
αz may leak some information about α. We avoid this by using Pedersen commitments while generating z.
We represent this protocol as follows:
￿
C
(α−1)
 g∗  ,(α−1)i
￿
= Inverse(n,t,f,ˆ g,ˆ h,
￿
C
(α)
 g  ,αi
￿
) (12)
Here g∗ belongs to any group of order p. The liveness, agreement and secrecy properties of the protocol are
the same as those of DKG-Sh except secrecy is deﬁned in the terms of α−1 instead of α; for the correctness
1For type 3 pairings, a careful selection of commitment generators is required to make the pairing-based veriﬁcation possible.
11property, along with recoverability to a unique value s, this protocol additionally mandates that s = α−1.
For a distributed secret
￿
C
(α)
 g  ,αi
￿
, protocol Inverse works as follows: every node Pi:
1. runs
￿
C
(z,z′)
 ˆ g,ˆ h  ,zi,z′
i
￿
= RandomPed(n,t,f,ˆ g,ˆ h);
2. computes shares of (w,w′) = (αz,αz′) as
￿
C
(w,w′)
 ˆ g,ˆ h  ,wi,w′
i
￿
= MulPed(n,t,f,ˆ g,ˆ h,
￿
C
(α)
 g  ,αi
￿
,
￿
C
(z,z′)
 ˆ g,ˆ h  ,zi,z′
i
￿
);
3. then sends (wi,w′
i) to each node and reconstructs w = DKG-RecPed(t,C
(w,w′)
 ˆ g,ˆ h  ,wi,w′
i). If w = 0,
repeats the above two steps, else locally computes (α−1)i = w−1zi;
4. ﬁnally, computes the commitment C
(α−1)
 g∗  using w−1, C
(z,z′)
 ˆ g,ˆ h  , and if required, any of the NIZKPK
techniques.
A modiﬁed form of this protocol is used in §5.4.
Analysis. This protocol is a combination of the RandomPed, MulPed and DKG-Rec protocols along
with some local computations. Therefore, its liveness and agreement properties follow directly from the
corresponding properties of protocol DKG. Uniqueness of the recovered value follows from the correctness
property of protocol DKG, while its equality to α−1 can be proven as follows: a share computed by a node
Pi at the end of protocol Inverse is equal to zi
zα, where C
( z
zα)
 g∗  is the associated commitment vector. When
reconstructed, it provides α−1 as follows:
DKG-RecFeld(t,C
( z
zα)
 g  ,
zi
zα
) =
1
zα
DKG-RecFeld(t,C
(z)
 g ,zi) =
z
zα
= α−1
Secrecy of protocol Inverse follows directly from secrecy of protocols Mul and DKG-ShPed. After the
reconstruction of w = zα, the distributed uniformly random element z and α remain private by the secrecy
properties of protocol Mul. As the ﬁnal shares of α−1 are generated using a local computation, there is no
secrecy loss in the last step either. It has the same asymptotic message and communication complexities as
those of protocol DKG-Sh.
5 Distributed PKG for IBE
We present and prove distributed PKG setup and private key extraction protocols for three IBE schemes:
BF-IBE [10], SK-IBE [56], and modiﬁed BB1-IBE [12]. Each of these schemes represents a distinct impor-
tant category of an IBE classiﬁcation deﬁned by Boyen [11]. They respectively belong to full-domain-hash
IBE schemes, exponent-inversion IBE schemes, and commutative-blinding IBE schemes. Note that the dis-
tributed PKG architectures that we develop for each of the three schemes apply to every scheme in their
respective categories. Our above choice of IBE schemes is inﬂuenced by a recent identity-based cryptogra-
phy standard (IBCS) [13] and also a comparative study by Boyen [12], which ﬁnds the above three schemes
to be the most practical IBE schemes in their respective categories. In his classiﬁcation, Boyen [11] also in-
cludes another category for quadratic-residuosity-based IBE schemes; however, none of the known schemes
in this category are practical enough to consider here.
The role of a PKG in an IBE scheme ends with a user’s private-key extraction. The distributed form
of the PKG does not affect the encryption and decryption steps of IBE. Consequently, we concentrate only
the distributed PKG setup and private-key extraction steps of the three IBE schemes under consideration.
12However, we recall the original encryption and decryption deﬁnitions for our proofs. We start by describing
a bootstrapping procedure required by all IBE schemes.
5.1 Bootstrapping Procedure
Each of the IBE schemes under consideration here requires the following three bootstrapping steps.
1. Determine the node group size n, the security threshold t and the crashed-nodes threshold f such that
n ≥ 3t + 2f + 1.
2. Choose the pairing type to be used and compute three groups G, ˆ G, and GT of prime order p such
that there exists a bilinear pairing e of the decided type with e : G × ˆ G → GT. The group order p is
determined by the security parameter κ. We will write all of the groups multiplicatively.
3. Choose two generators g ∈ G and ˆ g ∈ ˆ G required to generate public parameters as well as the
commitments. With a type 1 or 2 pairing, set g = φ(ˆ g).
Any untrusted entity can perform these ofﬂine tasks. Honest DKG nodes can verify the correctness of
the tuple (n,t,f) and conﬁrm the group choices G, ˆ G, and GT as the ﬁrst step of their distributed PKG
setup. If unsatisﬁed, they may decline to proceed. We denote the generated bilinear pairing group as
G =  e,G, ˆ G,Gt .
5.2 Formal Security Model
An IBE scheme with an (n,t,f)-distributed PKG consists of the following components:
• A distributed PKG setup protocol for node Pi that takes the above bootstrapped parameters n, t, f,
and G as input and outputs a share si of a shared master secret s and a corresponding public-key vector
Kpub of a master public key and n public-key shares.
• A distributed key-extraction protocol for node Pi that takes a client identity ID, the public key vector
Kpub and the master-secret share si as input and outputs a veriﬁable private-key share (dID)i. The
client computes the private key dID after verifying the received shares (dID)i.
• An encryption algorithm that takes a receiver identity ID, the master public key and a plaintext mes-
sage M as input and outputs a ciphertext C.
• A decryption algorithm for client with identity ID that takes a ciphertext C and the private key dID as
input and outputs a plaintext M.
Note that the above distributed PKG setup protocol doesn’t require any dealer and that we mandate ver-
iﬁability for the private-key shares rather than obtaining robustness using error-correcting techniques. Dur-
ing private-key extractions, we insist on minimal interaction between clients and PKG nodes—transferring
identity credentials from the client at the start and private-key shares from the nodes at the end.
To deﬁne security against an IND-ID-CCA attack, we consider the following game that a challenger
plays against a polynomially bounded t-limited adversary.
Setup: The adversary chooses to corrupt a ﬁxed set of t nodes. To run a distributed PKG setup protocol, the
challenger simulates the remaining n−t nodes. Of these, the adversary can further crash any f nodes at any
instance. Modelling these f crashed nodes is trivial. The adversary informs the indices of the crashed nodes
to the challenger, who makes sure not to use the inputs corresponding to those f nodes during the period they
are crashed. It, however, computes the internal states of the crashed nodes using the outputs corresponding
13to other n − t − f nodes that it runs. When the adversary modiﬁes it choice of the crashed nodes, the
challenger models the associated recoveries using the internal states computed during the protocol. Note
that, for the simplicity and clarity of the protocols and the proofs, we ignore these f crashes in exposition of
our distributed PKG setup and private-key extraction protocols.
At the end of the protocol execution, the adversary receives t shares of a shared master secret for its t
nodes and a public key vector Kpub. The challenger knows the remaining n − t shares and can derive the
master secret as n − t − f ≥ t + 1 in any communication setting.
Phase 1: The adversary adaptively issues private-key extraction and decryption queries to the challenger.
For a private-key extraction query  ID , the challenger simulates the distributed key extraction protocol for
its n − t nodes and sends veriﬁable private-key shares for its n − t − f nodes. For a decryption query
 ID,C , the challenger decrypts C by generating the private key dID or using the master secret.
Challenger: The adversary chooses two equal-length plaintexts M0 and M1, and a challenge identity IDch
such that IDch does not appear in any private-key extraction query in Phase 1. The challenger chooses
b ∈R {0,1} and encrypts Mb for IDch and Kpub, and gives the ciphertext Cch to the adversary.
Phase 2: The adversary adaptively issues more private-key extraction and decryption queries to the chal-
lenger except for key extraction query for  IDch  and decryption queries for  IDch,Cch .
Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0,1} and wins the game if b = b′.
Security against IND-ID-CCA attacks means that, for any polynomially bounded adversary, b′ = b with
probability negligibly greater than 1/2.
5.3 Boneh and Franklin’s BF-IBE
BF-IBE [10] belongs to the full-domain-hash IBE family. In a BF-IBE setup, a PKG generates a master
key s ∈ Zp and an associated public key gs ∈ G, and derives private keys (d ∈ ˆ G) for clients using their
well-known identities (ID) and s. A client with identity ID receives the private key dID = (H1(ID))
s =
hs
ID ∈ ˆ G, where H1 : {0,1}∗ → ˆ G∗ is a full-domain cryptographic hash function. (ˆ G∗ denotes the set of all
elements in ˆ G except the identity.) The security of BF-IBE is based on the BDH assumption.
Distributed PKG Setup. The distributed PKG setup involves generation of the system master key and the
associated system public-key tuple in the (n,t)-distributed form among n nodes. Each node Pi participates
in a common DKG over Zp to generate its share si ∈ Zp of the distributed master key s. The system public-
key tuple is of the form C
(s)
 g  = [gs,gs1,    ,gsn]. We obtain this using our RandomFeld protocol from
Eq. 7 as
￿
C
(s)
 g ,si
￿
= RandomFeld(n,t,g)
Private-key Extraction. After a successful setup, PKG nodes are ready to extract private keys for clients.
As a client needs t + 1 correct shares, it is sufﬁcient for the client to contact any 2t + 1 nodes (say set Q).
The private-key extraction protocol works as follows.
1. Once a client with identity ID contacts every node in Q, every honest node Pi ∈ Q veriﬁes the client’s
identity and returns a private-key share h
si
ID ∈ ˆ G over a secure and authenticated channel.
2. Upon receiving t+1valid shares, the client canconstruct herprivate key dID asdID =
Q
Pi∈Q(h
si
ID)λi ∈
ˆ G, where the Lagrange coefﬁcient λi =
Q
Pj∈Q\{i}
j
j−i.
3. The client can verify the correctness of the computed private key dID by checking e(g,dID)
? =
e(gs,hID)). If unsuccessful, she can verify the correctness of each received h
si
ID by checking if
14e(g,h
si
ID)
? = e(gsi,hID). An equality proves the correctness of the share, while an inequality indi-
cates misbehaviour by the node Pi and its consequential removal from Q.
In asymmetric pairings, elements of G generally have a shorter representation than those of ˆ G. There-
fore, we put the more frequently accessed system public-key shares in G, while the occasionally transferred
client private-key shares belong to ˆ G. This also leads to a reduction in the ciphertext size. However, for type
2 pairings, an efﬁcient hash-to-ˆ G is not available for the group ˆ G [29]; in that case we compute the system
public key shares in ˆ G and use the more feasible group G for the private key shares.
Encryption and Decryption. Boneh and Franklin obtain an IND-ID-CCA secure IBE encryption proto-
col (FullIdent) [10, §4.2] secure against the BDH assumption by applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto trans-
formation [28] to their IND-ID-CPA secure scheme (BasicIdent). Along with H1 : {0,1}∗ → ˆ G∗,
this scheme uses three more random oracles: H2 : Gt → {0,1}ℓ, H3 : {0,1}ℓ × {0,1}ℓ → Zp, and
H4 : {0,1}ℓ → {0,1}ℓ.
Encryption: To encrypt a message M of some ﬁxed bit length ℓ for a receiver of identity ID, a sender
chooses σ ∈R {0,1}ℓ, computes r = H3(σ,M) and hID = H1(ID), and sends C = (u,v,w) =
(gr,σ ⊕ H2(e(gs,hID)r),M ⊕ H4(σ)) to the receiver.
Decryption: To decrypt a ciphertext C = (u,v,w) using the private key dID, the receiver successively
computes σ = v⊕H2(e(u,dID)), M = w⊕H4(σ), and r = H3(σ,M). If gr  = u, then the receiver rejects
C, else it accepts M as a valid message.
Proof of Security. We prove the IND-ID-CCA security of BF-IBE with the (n,t)-distributed PKG ((n,t)-
FullIdent) based on the BDH assumption in the random oracle model. Hereafter, qE, qD and qHi denote the
number of extraction, decryption and random oracle Hi queries respectively.
Theorem 5.1. Let H1, H2, H3 and H4 be random oracles. Let A1 be an IND-ID-CCA adversary that has
advantage ǫ1(κ) in running time t1(κ) against (n,t)-FullIdent making at most qE, qD, qH1, qH2, qH3, and
qH4 queries. Then, there an algorithm B that solves the BDH problem in G with advantage roughly equal to
ǫ1(κ)/(qH1qH2(qH3 + qH4)) and running time O(t1(κ),qE,qD,qH1,qH2,qH3,qH4).
For their proof, Boneh and Franklin deﬁne two additional public key encryption schemes: IND-CPA
secure BFBasicPub [10, Sec. 4.1], and its IND-CCA secure version BFBasicPubhy [10, Sec. 4.2]. We
use distributed versions ofthese schemes: (n,t)-BFBasicPubhy and (n,t)-BFBasicPubrespectively. Both
(n,t)-BFBasicPubhy and (n,t)-BFBasicPub protocols have three steps: keygen, encrypt and decrypt.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the protocol (n,t)-BFBasicPub:
keygen: Given a bilinear group G for a security parameter κ, a set of n nodes runs the BF-IBE distributed
PKG setup for threshold t (n ≥ 3t + 1) to generate individual private keys si and a public key
tuple C
(s)
 g . n nodes also run protocol DKG-Sh to generate ˆ hID ∈R ˆ G. Assuming a random oracle
H2 : G → {0,1}ℓ, where ℓ is the message length, the system public key is  G,g, ˆ g,C
(s)
 g ,ˆ hID,H2 .
Every node generates its private-key share (dID)i = ˆ h
si
ID corresponding to the system’s private key
dID.
encrypt: To encrypt M ∈ {0,1}ℓ, choose r ∈R Z∗
p and set the ciphertext C = (gr,M ⊕H2(e(gs,hID)r)).
decrypt: To decrypt the ciphertext C = (u,v) using the private key shares (dID)i, compute and share
e(u,(dID)i) with every other node or with a common accumulator. Lagrange-interpolate these pairing
values to generate e(u,dID) and compute M = v ⊕ H2(e(u,dID)).
15Protocol (n,t)-BFBasicPubhy only modiﬁes the encrypt and decrypt steps of the above protocol using
the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [28], and random oracles H3 : {0,1}ℓ × {0,1}ℓ → Zp and H4 :
{0,1}ℓ → {0,1}ℓ.
Boneh and Franklin prove the security of FullIdent in the following proof-sequence: FullIdent →
BFBasicPubhy → BFBasicPub → BDH. Galindo [30] corrects a ﬂaw in their proof maintaining the
same proof-sequence. We also follow the same proof-sequence through Lemmas 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 to prove
Theorem 5.1:
(n,t)-FullIdent → (n,t)-BFBasicPub
hy → (n,t)-BFBasicPub → BDH.
Lemma 5.1. Let H1, H2, H3 and H4 be random oracles. Let A1 be an IND-ID-CCA adversary that has
advantage ǫ(κ) in running time t(κ) against (n,t)-FullIdent. Suppose A1 makes at most qE, qD, qH1,
qH2, qH3, and qH4 queries. Then there is an IND-CCA adversary A2 that has advantage at least ǫ(κ)/qH1
against BFBasicPubhy. Its running time is at most t(κ) + c(nqE + qD + qH1) where c is the average time
of exponentiation in ˆ G.
Proof. (Outline) The game between the challenger and the adversary A2 starts with the challenger running
the keygenstep of(n,t)-BFBasicPub
hy. A2 simultaneously starts adversary A1 andforwards all messages
from the challenger to A1 and vice versa. As a result, in this simulation game, t out of n nodes are run by
A1, while the challenger runs the remaining n − t nodes. A2, however, knows all information gathered
by A1. At the end of the distributed PKG setup, along with A1’s public parameters, A2 also knows secret
shares si for the t nodes run by A1. The rest of the game and the analysis remains the same as that of [30],
except during key extraction queries. Here, instead of a private key dID, A2 has to provide t+1 private-key
shares to A1. This is, however, easily possible knowing A1’s t secret shares and the randomness used during
H1 queries. Refer to [30, §3] for the rest of the proof.
Lemma5.2 (Fujisaki-Okamoto [28]). Let H3 and H4 be random oracles. Let A2 be an IND-CCAadversary
that has advantage ǫ2(κ) in running time t2(κ) against (n,t)-BFBasicPubhy making at most qD, qH3, and
qH4 queries. Then there is an IND-CPA adversary A3 that has advantage at least 1
2(qH3+qH4)[(ǫ2(κ) +
1)(1−2/p)qD −1] against (n,t)-BFBasicPub. Its running time is at most t2(κ)+O((qH3 +qH4)ℓ), where
ℓ is the message length.
Lemma 5.3. Let H2 be a random oracle. Let A3 be an IND-CPA adversary that has advantage ǫ3(κ) in
running time t3(κ) against (n,t)-BFBasicPub making at most qH2 queries. Then there is an algorithm
B that solves the BDH problem in  e,G, ˆ G,Gt  with advantage at least 2ǫ3(κ)/qH2 and a running time
O(t3(κ)).
Proof. Algorithm B is given a random instance of the BDH problem  g, ˆ g,ga,ˆ ga,gb,ˆ gc  in a bilinear group
G. Let D = e(g, ˆ g)abc ∈ Gt be the solution to this problem. Algorithm B ﬁnds D by interacting with A3 as
follows:
Setup: B runs the keygen step of (n,t)-BFBasicPub using the BDH instance. Let PBad be the set of t
parties corrupted or owned by A3. Let PGood be the set of remaining good parties which will be run by
B. B wants to make sure that the challenge ga and ˆ gc are included respectively in gs ∈ C
(s)
 g  and ˆ hID of
(n,t)-BFBasicPub. As in protocol DKG-Sh, the VSSs selection may not be under B’s control, B uses
(ga) i and (ˆ gc) ′
i for  i, ′
i ∈R Z∗
p as its contributions towards respectively s and ˆ hID in keygen for every
Pi ∈ PGood. More speciﬁcally, for every Pi ∈ PGood, B chooses  i, ′
i ∈R Z∗
p and sij,s′
ij ∈R Zp for every
Pj ∈ PBad, where si,j and s′
ij are subshares for Pj of VSSs run by Pi. Although B does not know the
contributions  ia and  ′
ic, it can provide consistent commitment vectors C
( ia)
 g  and C
( ′
ic)
 ˆ g  to A3 knowing
sij,s′
ij for Pj ∈ PBad,  i,  ′
i, ga, and ˆ gc. ForVSSsrun by the adversary nodes Pj ∈ PBad, B can reconstruct
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j using n−t subshares obtained from Pj. Therefore, for any subset of VSSs
Q and Q′ chosen ﬁnally, s = a
P
Pi∈QGood  i +
P
Pj∈QBad νi and ˆ hID = ˆ g
c
P
Pi∈Q′
Good
 ′
i+
P
Pj∈Q′
Bad
ν′
i.
Note that B knows ν =
P
Pj∈QBad νi, ν′ =
P
Pj∈Q′
Bad ν′
i   =
P
Pi∈QGood  i and  ′ =
P
Pi∈Q′
Good  ′
i.
Let si be the ﬁnal share of s for each node Pi. Observe that the (unknown) associated private key dID =
ˆ g(a +ν)(c ′+ν′) = ˆ g  ′(ac)+ ν′(a)+ ′ν(c)+νν′
. B runs random oracle H2 for A3 creating a list Hlist
2 of
 Gt,{0,1}ℓ . An entry  xi,hi  indicates that hi = H2(xi). Finally, it is easy to see that this simulated view
of A3 is identically distributed as in a real execution of keygen.
The rest of the game and the analysis remains the same as that of [10, Lemma 4.3], except during Guess
step. Here, instead of returning xi from a random tuple  xi,hi  from Hlist
2 as answer to the BDH problem,
B returns ￿
xi
e(gb, ˆ ga) ν′e(gb,ˆ gc) ′νe(gb, ˆ g)νν′
￿(  ′)−1
.
Here, if xi is the correct choice, then xi is equal to e(g, ˆ g)abc  ′+ab ν′+bc ′ν+bνν′
instead of e(g, ˆ g)abc
in the original BF-IBE proof.
5.4 Sakai and Kasahara’s SK-IBE
SK-IBE [56] belongs to the exponent-inversion IBE family. The PKG setup here remains exactly same as
BF-IBE and the PKG generates a master key s ∈ Zp and an associated public key gs ∈ G just as in BF-IBE.
However, the key-extraction differs signiﬁcantly. Here, a client with identity ID receives the private key
dID = ˆ g
1
s+H′
1(ID) ∈ ˆ G, where H′
1 : {0,1}∗ → Zp. Chen and Cheng [21] prove the security of SK-IBE based
on the BDHIassumption.
Distributed PKG Setup. The distributed PKG setup remains the exactly same as that of BF-IBE, where
si ∈ Zp is the master-key share for node Pi and C
(s)
 g  = [gs,gs1,    ,gsn] is the system public-key tuple.
Private-key Extraction. The private-key extraction for SK-IBE is not as straightforward as that for BF-
IBE. We modify the Inverse protocol described in §4.6; speciﬁcally, here a private-key extracting client
receives wi from the node in step 3 and instead of PKG nodes, the client performs the interpolation step
of DKG-Rec. In step 4, instead of publishing, PKG nodes forward ˆ gzi and the associated NIZKPK≡Com
directly to the client, which computes ˆ gz and then dID = (ˆ gz)w−1
. The reason behind this is to avoid
possible key escrow if the node computes both ˆ gz and w. Further, the nodes precompute another generator
ˆ h ∈ ˆ G for Pedersen commitments using
￿
C
(r)
 ˆ g ,ri
￿
= RandomFeld(n,t,ˆ g), and set ˆ h =
￿
C
(r)
 ˆ g 
￿
0
= ˆ gr.
1. Once a client with identity ID contacts all n nodes the system, every node Pi veriﬁes the client’s
identity, runs
￿
C
(z,z′)
 ˆ g,ˆ h  ,zi,z′
i
￿
= RandomPed(n,t, ˆ g,ˆ h) and computes sID
i = si + H′
1(ID) and for
0 ≤ j ≤ n,
￿
C
(sID)
 g 
￿
j
=
￿
C
(s)
 g 
￿
j
gH′
1(ID) = gsj+H′
1(ID).
2. Pi performs
￿
C
(w,w′)
 ˆ g,ˆ h  ,wi,w′
i
￿
= MulPed(n,t, ˆ g,ˆ h,
￿
C
(sID)
 g  ,sID
i
￿
,
￿
C
(z,z′)
 ˆ g,ˆ h  ,zi,z′
i
￿
), where w = sIDz
= (s+H′
1(ID))z and w′ = (s+H′
1(ID))z′ and sends
￿
C
(w)
 ˆ g,ˆ h ,wi
￿
along with NIZKPK≡Com(wi,w′
i,
￿
C
(w)
 ˆ g 
￿
i
,
￿
C
(w,w′)
 ˆ g,ˆ h 
￿
i
) to the client, which upon receiving t + 1 veriﬁably correct shares (wi) recon-
structs w using Lagrange-interpolation. If w  = 0, then it computes w−1 or else starts again from step
1.
173. Node Pi sends
￿
C
(z)
 ˆ g 
￿
i
= ˆ gzi along with NIZKPK≡Com(zi,z′
i,
￿
C
(z)
 ˆ g 
￿
i
,
￿
C
(z,z′)
 ˆ g,ˆ h 
￿
i
) to the client.
4. The client veriﬁes
￿
C
(z)
 ˆ g 
￿
i
using the received NIZKPK≡Com, Lagrange-interpolates t+1 valid ˆ gzi to
compute ˆ gz and derives her private key (ˆ gz)w−1
= ˆ g
1
(s+H(ID)).
This protocol can be used without any modiﬁcation with any type of pairing. Further, online execution of
the RandomPed computation can be eliminated using batch precomputation of distributed random elements ￿
C
(z,z′)
 ˆ g,ˆ h  ,zi,z′
i
￿
.
Encryption and Decryption. Chen and Cheng [21] deﬁne an IND-ID-CCA secure version of the SK-
IBE scheme secure against the BDHI assumption. Here, the random oracle H1 in BF-IBE is replaced by
H′
1 : {0,1}∗ → Zp. The other random oracles H2, H3 and H4 remain the same. This scheme also uses
Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [28] to achieve IND-ID-CCA security.
Encryption: To encrypt a message M of some ﬁxed bit length ℓ for a receiver of identity ID, a sender
chooses σ ∈R {0,1}ℓ, computes r = H3(σ,M) and hID = H′
1(ID), and sends C = (u,v,w) =
((gsghID)r,σ ⊕ H2(e(g, ˆ g)r),M ⊕ H4(σ)) to the receiver.
Decryption: To decrypt a ciphertext C = (u,v,w) using the private key dID, the receiver successively
computes σ = v⊕H2(e(u,dID)), M = w⊕H4(σ), and r = H3(σ,M). If (gsghID)r  = u, then the receiver
rejects C, else it accepts M as a valid message.
Proof of Security. The security of SK-IBE with a distributed PKG ((n,t)-SK-IBE) is based on the BDHI
assumption.
Theorem 5.2. Let H, H′
1, H2, H3 and H4 be random oracles. Let A1 be an IND-ID-CCA adversary that
has advantage ǫ1(κ) in running time t1(κ) against (n,t)-SK-IBE making at most qE, qD, qH′
1, qH2, qH3,
and qH4 queries. Then, there is an algorithm B that solves the BDHI problem in G with advantage roughly
equal to ǫ1(κ)/(qH′
1qH2(qH3 + qH4)) and running time O(t1(κ),qE,qD,qH,qH′
1,qH2,qH3,qH4).
Chen and Cheng use the same technique as that of BF-IBE (with the modiﬁcation by Galindo) to obtain
the proof sequence SK-IBE → SKBasicPub
hy → SKBasicPub → BDHI. We also use the same proof se-
quence. Here, however, we divert from the proof of Theorem 5.1 for (n,t)-FullIdent. To prove Theorem 5.2
for (n,t)-SK-IBE, we show that (n,t)-SK-IBE → SKBasicPub
hy, where SKBasicPub
hy is a public key
encryption scheme based on SK-IBE as deﬁned in [21, §3.2]. Note that SKBasicPub
hy is not a distributed
scheme. Therefore, recalling Lemma 2 and 3 from [21] to prove SKBasicPub
hy → SKBasicPub and
SKBasicPub → BDHI respectively we complete the proof of Theorem 5.2. Next, we prove (n,t)-SK-IBE
→ SKBasicPub
hy.
Lemma 5.4. Let H′
1, H2 be random oracles. Let A1 be an IND-ID-CCA adversary that has advantage ǫ(κ)
in running time t(κ) against (n,t)-SK-IBE. Suppose A1 makes at most qE, qD, and qH′
1 queries. Then there
is an IND-CCA adversary A2 that has advantage at least ǫ(κ)/qH′
1 against SKBasicPub
hy. Its running
time is at most t(κ) + c(nqE + qD + qH′
1) where c is the average time of exponentiation in ˆ G.
Proof. We construct an IND-CCA adversary A2 that uses A1 to gain advantage against SKBasicPub
hy.
(Forthe deﬁnition of SKBasicPub
hy, refer to [21, §3.2].) The gamebetween a challenger and A2 starts with
thechallenger running algorithm keygenofSKBasicPub
hy togenerate apublic keyKpub =  G,g, ˆ g,gs,h0,
(h1, ˆ g
1
h1+s),...,(hi, ˆ g
1
hi+s),...,(hqH′
1
,ˆ g
1
hqH′
1
+s
),H2,H3,H4 . Let ˆ g
1
h0+s be the corresponding private
key. The challenger gives Kpub to A2, which is supposed to launch an IND-CCA attack on SKBasicPub
hy
18using A1. A2 simulates the challenger for A1 as follows.
Setup: As the distributed PKG setup in SK-IBE is same as that of BF-IBE, we reuse much of the Setup
simulation of (n,t)-BFBasicPub in Lemma 5.3. However, we do not require their ˆ hID computation and
ga is replaced by gs. The master key ﬁnally generated is equal to s′ = s
P
Pi∈QGood  i +
P
Pj∈QBad νi,
where A2 knows ν =
P
Pj∈QBad νi and   =
P
Pi∈QGood di. To make the pairs (hi, ˆ g
1
hi+s) compatible with
s′, A2 deﬁnes h′
i =  hi − ν and ˆ g′ = ˆ g . To answer H′
1 and key extraction queries for A1, A2 uses pairs
(h′
i,ˆ g′
1
h′
i+s′), where A2 uses h′
i as a hash value and ˆ g′
1
h′
i+s′ as the corresponding private key. Further, A1 is
provided ˆ g′ instead of ˆ g as a public parameter. A2 also runs random oracle H′
1 and H for A1, where H is a
random oracle required in NIZKPK≡Com.
H′
1 queries: Same as in [21, §3.2].
Phase 1 - Extraction Queries: Though private keys in the form of (h′
i, ˆ g′
1
h′
i+s′) tuples are available, A2
has to generate those for A1 in a distributed way as deﬁned in the private-key extraction protocol. This is
non-trivial for A2 as it has to provide shares of w = (s′ + h′
i)z to A2 without knowing its shares of s′. To
achieve this, it ﬁrst chooses w ∈R Z∗
p and computes ˆ g′
w
h′
i+s′ = ˆ g′zw, where zw is the randomness which
A2 wants to obtain from RandomPed. It then completes the actual RandomPed and MulPed protocols
normally by playing the part of good parties. It determines z and z′ generated by RandomPed using its
n − t shares and also knows wi,w′
i for Pi ∈ PBad. Using w and wi for Pi ∈ PBad, it generates wi and
ˆ gwi for all parties. To provide the required NIZKPK≡Com for ˆ gwi, A2 randomly generates challenge τ and
response (u1,u2), computes commitments (t1,t2) and includes an entry  (ˆ g′,ˆ h,F,P,t1,t2),τ  in the hash
table of H before forwarding π≡Com = (τ,u1,u2) to A1. Similarly, using ˆ g′zw = ˆ g′
w
h′
i+s′ and ˆ g′zwi = ˆ g′zi
for Pi ∈ PBad, it generates ˆ g′zwi for each Pi and provides its NIZKPK≡Com, which results in A1 generating
ˆ g′
1
h′
i+s′ as its private key.
The rest of the game and the analysis remains exactly the same as [21, §3.2]. It is interesting to observe
that despite the different master keys (s for SKBasicPub
hy and s′ = s +ν for (n,t)-SK-IBE), the cipher-
text queries C =  u,v,w  remain the same when transferred from A1 to the challenger during decryption
queries and from the challenger to A1 during the challenge phase.
5.5 Boneh and Boyen’s BB1-IBE
BB1-IBE belongs to the commutative-blinding IBE family. Boneh and Boyen [9] proposed the original
scheme with a security reduction to the decisional BDH assumption [39] in the standard model against
selective-identity attacks. However, withapractical requirement ofsecurity against adaptive-identity chosen-
ciphertext attacks (IND-ID-CCA), in the recent IBCS standard [13], Boyen and Martin proposed a modiﬁed
version of BB1, which is IND-ID-CCA secure in the random oracle model under the BDH assumption. In
[12], Boyen rightly claims that for practical applications, it would be preferable to rely on the random-oracle
assumption rather than using a less efﬁcient IBE scheme with a stronger security assumption or a weaker
attack model. Here, we consider the modiﬁed BB1-IBE scheme as described in [12] and [13].
In the BB1-IBE setup, the PKG generates a master-key triplet (α,β,γ) ∈ Z3
p and an associated public
keytuple (gα,gγ,e(g, ˆ g)αβ). Aclient withidentity IDreceives the private keytuple dID = (ˆ gαβ+(αH′
1(ID)+γ)r,
ˆ gr) ∈ ˆ G2, where H′
1 : {0,1}∗ → Zp.
Distributed PKG Setup. In [12], Boyen does not include the parameters ˆ g and ˆ gβ from the original BB1
scheme [9] in his public key, as they are not required during key extraction, encryption or decryption (they
are not omitted for security reasons). In the distributed setting, we in fact need those parameters to be public
for efﬁciency reasons; a veriﬁable distributed computation of e(g, ˆ g)αβ becomes inefﬁcient otherwise. To
19avoid key escrow of clients’ private-key components (ˆ gr), we also need ˆ h and C
(β)
 ˆ h ; otherwise, parts of
clients’ private keys would appear in public commitment vectors. As in SK-IBE in §5.4, this extra generator
ˆ h ∈ ˆ G is precomputed using the RandomFeld protocol. Distributed PKG setup of BB1 involves distributed
generation of the master-key tuple (α,β,γ). Distributed PKG node Pi achieves this using the following
three RandomFeld protocol invocations:
￿
C
(α)
 g  ,αi
￿
= RandomFeld(n,t,f,g),
￿
C
(β)
 ˆ g ,βi
￿
= RandomFeld(n,t,f,ˆ g),
￿
C
(γ)
 g ,γi
￿
= RandomFeld(n,t,f,g).
Here, (αi,βi,γi) is the tuple of master-key shares for node Pi. We also need C
(β)
 ˆ h ; each node Pi
provides this by publishing
￿
C
(β)
 ˆ h 
￿
i
= ˆ hβi and the associated NIZKPK≡DLog(βi, ˆ gβi,ˆ hβi). The tuple
￿
C
(α)
 g  ,e(g, ˆ g)αβ,C
(γ)
 g ,C
(β)
 ˆ h 
￿
forms the system public key, where e(g, ˆ g)αβ can computed from the public
commitment entries. The vector C
(β)
 ˆ g , although available publicly, is not required for any further computa-
tion.
Private-key Extraction. The most obvious way to compute a BB1 private key seems to be for Pi to
compute αiβi + (αiH′
1(ID) + γi)ri and provide the corresponding ˆ gαiβi+(αiH′
1(ID)+γi)ri, ˆ gri to the client,
who now needs 2t + 1 valid shares to obtain her private key. However, αiβi + (αiH′
1(ID) + γi)ri here is
not a share of a random degree-2t polynomial. The possible availability of ˆ gri to the adversary creates a
suspicion about secrecy of the master-key share with this method.
For private-key extraction in BB1-IBE with a distributed PKG, we instead use the MulBP protocol in
which the client is provided with ˆ gwi, where wi = (αβ + (αH′
1(ID) + γ)r)i is a share of random degree t
polynomial. The protocol works as follows.
1. Once a client with identity ID contacts all n nodes the system, every node Pi veriﬁes the client’s iden-
tity and runs
￿
C ˆ h,ˆ g, (r,r′),[C
(r)
 ˆ h ,NIZKPK≡Com],ri,ri
￿
= RandomPed(n,t,f,ˆ h, ˆ g). RandomPed
makes sure that r is uniformly random.
2. Pi computes its share wi of w = αβ + (αH′
1(ID) + γ)r using protocol MulBP in Eq. 11.
￿
C
(w)
 g∗ ,wi
￿
= MulBP(n,t,f,g∗,desc,
￿
C
(α)
 g  ,αi
￿
,
￿
C
(β)
 ˆ h ,βi
￿
,
￿
C
(γ)
 g ,γi
￿
,
￿
C
(r)
 ˆ h ,ri
￿
)
where desc = {(1,1,2),(H′
1(ID),1,4),(1,3,4)} is the description of the required binary product
under the ordering (α,β,γ,r) of secrets. Tojustify our choices of commitment generators, wepresent
the pairing-based veriﬁcation in protocol MulBP:
e(gαiβi+(αiH′
1(ID)+γi)ri,ˆ h)
? = e(gαi,ˆ hβi)e((gαi)H′
1(ID)gγi,ˆ hri)
.
For type 2 and 3 pairings, g∗ = g, as there is no efﬁcient isomorphism from G to ˆ G. However, for
type 1 pairings, we use g∗ = ˆ h = φ−1(h). Otherwise, the resultant commitments for w (which are
public) will contain the private-key part gαβ+(αH′
1(ID)+γ)r.
203. Once the MulBP protocol has succeeded, Node Pi generates ˆ gwi and ˆ gri and sends those to the client
over a secure and authenticated channel.
4. Theclient Lagrange-interpolates the validreceived shares togenerate herprivate key(ˆ gαβ+(αH′
1(ID)+γ)r,
ˆ gr). For type 1 and type 2 pairings, the client can use the pairing-based DDH solving to check the
validity of the shares. However, for type 3 pairings, without an efﬁcient mapping from ˆ G to G,
pairing-based DDH solving can only be employed to verify ˆ gwi. As a veriﬁcation of ˆ gri, node Pi
includes a NIZKPK≡DLog(ri,ˆ hri, ˆ gri) along with ˆ gwi and ˆ gri.
As in SK-IBE in §5.4, online execution of the RandomFeld computation can be eliminated using batch
precomputation of distributed random elements
￿
C
(r)
 ˆ h ,ri
￿
.
Encryption and Decryption. Similar to the PKG setup and the key extraction protocols for BB1-IBE in
§5.5, we use the BB1-IBE version deﬁned in [12] and [13] for the encryption and decryption protocols here.
Boyen [12] claims IND-ID-CCA security of this system against the BDH assumption. This scheme uses
H′
3 = Gt × {0,1}ℓ × G × G → Zp along with H′
1 and H2 from SK-IBE.
Encryption:To encrypt a message M of some ﬁxed bit length ℓ for a receiver of identity ID, a sender
chooses σ ∈R {0,1}ℓ, computes k = (e(g, ˆ g)αβ)σ and hID = H1(ID), and sends the ciphertext C =
(ρ,ρ0,ρ1,t) = (M ⊕ H2(k),gσ,(gγ(gα)hID)σ, σ + H′
3(k,ρ,ρ0,ρ1)) to the receiver.
Decryption: To decrypt a ciphertext C = (ρ,ρ0,ρ1,t) using the private key dID = (ˆ gαβ+(αH′
1(ID)+γ)r,ˆ gr)
= (d0,d1) (say), the receiver successively computes k = e(ρ0,d0)/e(ρ1,d1) and σ = t − H3(k,ρ,ρ0,ρ1).
If k  = (e(g, ˆ g)αβ)σ or ρ0  = gσ, then the receiver rejects C, else it accepts M = ρ ⊕ H2(k) as a valid
message.
Proof of Security. We prove IND-ID-CCA security of BB1-IBE with the (n,t)-distributed PKG ((n,t)-
BB1-IBE) based on the BDH assumption. To the best of our knowledge, an IND-ID-CCA security proof for
the modiﬁed BB1-IBE scheme has not been published yet and a non-distributed version of our proof is the
ﬁrst to provide IND-ID-CCA security for this protocol.
Theorem 5.3. Let H′
1, H2, H3 and H′
4 be random oracles. Let A be an IND-ID-CCA adversary that has
advantage ǫ(κ) in running time t(κ) against (n,t)-BB1-IBE making at most qE, qD, qH′
1, qH2, qH′
3, and qH4
queries. Then, there an algorithm B that solves the BDH problem in G with advantage roughly equal to
ǫ(κ)/(qH′
1qH′
3) and running time O(t(κ),qE,qD,qH′
1,qH2,qH′
3,qH4).
Proof. Algorithm B is given a random BDH problem  g, ˆ g,ga, ˆ ga,ˆ gb,gc  in bilinear group G as input. Let
D = e(g, ˆ g)abc ∈ Gt be the solution to this problem. Algorithm B ﬁnds D by interacting with A as follows:
Setup: B makes a virtual network of n parties and runs the distributed setup of (n,t)-BB1-IBE using the
given BDH instance. Let PBad be the set of t parties corrupted or owned by A3. Let PGood be the set of
remaining good parties which will be run by B. B wants to make sure that the challenge ga is included in
both gα ∈ C
(α)
 g  and gγ ∈ C
(γ)
 g , and the challenge ˆ gb is included in ˆ gβ ∈ C
(β)
 ˆ g . Similar to the (n,t)-FullIdent
BF-IBEand (n,t)-SK-IBE proofs, the generated master key tuple (α,β,γ) = ( 1a+ν1, 2b+ν2, 3a+ν3).
Let  3a+ν3 = −αh∗
ID +α′, where h∗
ID = − 3/ 1 is a challenge identity-hash and α′ = ν3 − ν1 3/ 1 =
αh∗
ID + γ. α′ is completely random as the   and ν values are not under B’s control. Finally, B outputs ￿
C
(α)
 g  ,e(g, ˆ g)αβ,C
(γ)
 g ,[C
(β)
 ˆ h ,NIZKPK≡DLog]
￿
as the system public key.
H′
1 queries: Before initializing H′list
1 , B chooses j ∈R {1,...,qH1}. When A queries H′
1 for IDi, B
proceeds as follows: if i  = j, it picks hIDi ∈R Zp, adds a tuple  IDi,hIDi  and gives back hIDi to A. If i =
j, it sets  IDj,h∗
ID . Note that multiple queries for the same identity are answered with the corresponding
entry in its H′list
1 . Further, the output of H′
1 is uniformly distributed in Zp and independent of A’s view.
21H2 and H′
3 queries: Initially, these lists are empty. When a query for H2 or H′
3 arrives, B ﬁrst checks
if an entry for the query input already exists in the corresponding list. If it is presents, B responds with
the associated response, else B sends a random element of the appropriate size as its response, adds an
input and response tuple in the oracle list. The corresponding (random) oracle list entries look as follows:
Hlist
2 (Gt,{0,1}ℓ) =  ki,hki , and H′list
3 (Gt,{0,1}ℓ,G,G) =  ki,ρi,ρ0i,ρ1i , where ℓ is the message
length.
Phase 1 - Extraction Queries: When A asks for the private key for IDi, B ﬁrst gets H′
1(IDi) = hIDi. If
i = j, then B aborts the game and the attack fails. If i  = j, B starts the distributed private-key extraction
protocol by running
￿
C ˆ h,ˆ g, (r,r′),ri,ri
￿
= RandomPed(n,t,f,ˆ h, ˆ g). B knows r, r′ as well as shares of
the nodes as it runs n − t nodes. It then computes ˆ h˜ r =
ˆ hr
(ˆ hβ)∆h = ˆ hr−β/∆h where ∆h = hIDi − h∗
ID.
Using ˆ h˜ r and t adversary commitments ˆ hri for i ∈ PBad, B computes the commitments C
(˜ r)
 ˆ h . To provide the
required NIZKPK≡Com for each entry in C
(˜ r)
 ˆ h , A2 randomly generates challenge τi and response (u1i,u2i),
computes commitments (t1i,t2i) and includes an entry  (ˆ g′,ˆ h,ˆ h˜ ri,ˆ hriˆ gr′
i,t1i,t2i),τi  in the hash table of
H before forwarding π≡Com = (τi,u1i,u2i) to A.
It then computes d′
0 = (g∗)−βα′/∆h(g∗)αr∆h+α′r = (g∗)αβ+(αhIDi+γ)˜ r and using known shares of αi,
βi and γi for Pi ∈ PBad, it runs MulBP for w = αβ + (αhIDi + γ)˜ r. Note that B does not know its shares,
but it can compute their commitments using d′
0 and the inputs from PBad. With its (n,t) subshares, it also
knows the ﬁnal shares wi for Pi ∈ PBad. It then computes the required private key shares ˆ gwi and ˆ g˜ ri for
Pi ∈ PGood and forwards them to A.
Phase 1 - Decryption Queries: B answers A’s decryption queries (IDi,Ci) as follows. B ﬁrst gets
H′
1(IDi) = hIDi. Ifi  = j, B obtains theprivate key(ˆ gαβ+(αhIDi+γ)˜ r,ˆ gr)and decrypts Ci = (ti,ρi,ρ0i,ρ1i).
If i = j, then B cannot compute the private key and it uses H2 and H′
3 instead. B searches H′list
3 for
  ,ρi,ρ0i,ρ1i . If this tuple belongs to a valid ciphertext by A, then there must be one or more correspond-
ing entries in H′list
3 . For each such entry, retrieve ki and the hash value h′
3i. Compute si = ti − h′
3IDi and
check if the component-wise equality (ki,ρ0i)
? = (e(g, ˆ g)s,gs) holds. As e(g, ˆ g), g and ρ0i are ﬁxed for a
query, this equality only holds for a single or no ki value and correspondingly a single or no entry in H′list
3 .
If there is no such entry, then B discards the ciphertext, else B searches for ki in Hlist
2 . If there is no entry,
then B adds a random entry h2i for ki in Hlist
2 . Finally, it returns the plaintext M as M = ρi ⊕ h2i.
Challenge: A outputs an identity IDch and two messages M0 and M1. If IDch  = IDj, then it aborts the
game and the attack fails, else B sends (ρb ∈R {0,1}ℓ,ρ0b = gc,ρ1b = (gc)α′
,tb ∈R Zp) as a challenge
ciphertext Cb to A.
Phase 2 - Extraction Queries: B proceeds as in Phase 1, expect the extraction query for IDch is rejected.
Phase 2 - Decryption Queries: B proceeds as in Phase 1, expect the decryption query for  IDch,Cb  is
rejected.
Guess: A outputs its guess b′ ∈ {0,1}. Now, there must be one or more entries for   ,ρb,ρ0b,ρ1b  in H′list
3 .
B randomly picks one of those tuples  ki,ρi,ρ0i,ρ1i  and returns ki as its answer D.
For a random BDH problem  g, ˆ g,ga, ˆ ga, ˆ gb,gc  in bilinear group G, A’s view is identical to its view in
a real attack game. It is easy to observe that B outputs correct D with probability ǫ(κ)/(qH′
1qH′
3).
Using a more expensive DKG protocol with uniformly random output, all of our proofs would become
relatively simpler. However, note that our use of DKG without uniformly random output does not affect
the security reduction factor in any proof. This is something not achieved for the known previous protocols
with non-uniform DKG such as threshold Schorr signatures [35]. Further, we do not discuss the liveness
and agreement properties for our asynchronous protocols as liveness and agreement of all the distributed
primitives provides liveness and agreement for the distributed PKG setup and distributed key extraction
protocols. Finally, for simplicity of the discussion, it would have been better to combine three proofs.
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Figure 1: Completion Time (with min/max bars) vs System Size (log-log plot)
However, that looks difﬁcult, if not impossible, as the distributed computation tools used in these distributed
PKGs and the original IBE security proofs vary a lot from a scheme to scheme.
6 System Aspects
In this section, we discuss the system aspects of distributed PKGs. As DKG is by far the most important
component of our distributed PKGs, we ﬁrst implement and test the DKG protocol [42] that we use in our
distributed PKGs. In the process, we propose several system-level optimizations for this DKG. We also
analyze practical aspects of our distributed PKGs and present a comparative study. Finally, we mention
proactive security and group modiﬁcation protocols for our distributed PKGs.
Note that two distributed CAs for PKC, Ω [55] and Cornell Online Certiﬁcation Authority (COCA) [63],
have been designed previously. However, with their focus on CAs, the protocols they provide are mis-
matched to the requirements of a distributed PKG. As a result, we do not design our distributed PKGs using
these solutions.
6.1 DKG Implementation on PlanetLab
We design our DKG nodes as state machines (using the state machine replication approach [45, 57]), where
nodes move from one state to another based on messages received. Messages are categorized into three
types: operator messages, network messages and timer messages. The operator messages deﬁne interactions
between nodes andtheir operators, thenetwork messages realize protocol ﬂowsbetween nodes, and thetimer
messages implement the weak synchrony assumption described in §3.1.
We aim at building a distributed PKG for IBE schemes. Therefore, we develop our object-oriented C++
implementation over the PBC library [47] for the underlying elliptic-curve and ﬁnite-ﬁeld operations and a
PKI infrastructure with DSA signatures based on GnuTLS [48] for conﬁdentiality and message authentica-
tion. (Note that nodes have TLS PKI certiﬁcates, which does not conﬂict with the goal of providing IBE
private keys to clients.) In order to examine its realistic performance, we test our DKG implementation on
the PlanetLab platform [54].
Performance Analysis. We test the performance of our DKG implementation for systems of up to 40
nodes and we observe an expected approximately cubic growth in the average completion time.2 Figure 1
presents our results in graphical form. In practical applications such as [43], these values, ranging from
seconds to a little over an hour, are small as compared to DKG phase sizes (in days). Importantly, the use of
dedicated high-performance servers instead of unreliable resource-shared PlanetLab nodes can drastically
2With cubic message complexity, larger distributed systems (n > 50) are not practical for the Internet.
23Table 1: Operation count and key sizes for distributed PKG setups and distributed private-key extractions
(per key)
BF-IBE SK-IBE BB1-IBE
Setup Extraction Setup Extraction Setup Extraction
Operation Count: Generator h or ˆ h X
√ √
DKG-Sh
a
(precomputed) - 0 - 1
P - 1
P
(online) 1
F 0 1
F 1
P 3
F 1
F
Parings
@PKG Node 0 0 0 2n 1
b 2n
@Client - 2(2t + 2) - 0 - 2n
b
NIZKPK 0 0 0 2n n
b 2n
b
Interpolations 0 1 0 2 1 2
Key Sizes: PKG Public Key (n + 2)G
c (n + 3)G (2n + 3)G, (n + 2)ˆ G, (1)GT
Private-key Shares (2t + 1)ˆ G
c (3n)Zp, (3n + 1)ˆ G (2n)Zp
b, (2n)ˆ G
aFor DKG-Sh F indicates use of Feldman commitments, while P indicates Pedersen commitments.
bFor type 1 and 2 pairings, n NIZKPKs can be replaced by 2n extra pairings and the 2n Zp elements are omitted from the
private-key shares.
cFor type 2 parings, the groups used for the PKG public key and the private-key shares are interchanged.
improve the performance. We also measure minimum and maximum completion times for the experiments.
Big gaps between those values demonstrate the robustness of the DKG system against the Internet’s asyn-
chronous nature and varied resource levels of the PlanetLab nodes.
To check the applicability of the weak synchrony assumption [18] that we use in DKG, we also tested
the system with crashed leaders. In such scenarios, the DKG protocol successfully completed after a few
leader changes. However, we observe that the average completion time of a system critically varies with the
choice of delay(t) functions and we suggest that this should only be ﬁnalized for a system after rigorous
testing.
While implementing this system, we also found two system-level optimizations for this DKG.
• To the original DKG protocol, we add a new shared network message from a node to a leader having
2t+f+1 signed ready messages for a completed VSS. The leader can then include this VSS instance
in its DKG send without completion of the VSS instance at its own machine.
• During our experiments, we observed that the VSS instances are more resource consuming than the
agreement required at the end. Except during the Mul protocol, we only need t + 1 VSS instances to
succeed. Assuming t + f VSS instances might fail during a DKG, it is sufﬁcient to start VSSs at just
2t+f +1 nodes instead of at all n nodes. Nodes that do not start a VSS initially may utilize the weak
synchrony assumption to determine to when to start a VSS instance if required.
6.2 Comparing Distributed PKGs
In this section, we concentrate on the performance of the setup and key extraction procedures of the three
distributed PKGs deﬁned in §5. For a detailed comparison of the encryption and decryption algorithms of
BF-IBE,SK-IBE and BB1-IBE, we refer readers to the survey by Boyen [12]. The general recommendations
from this survey are to avoid SK-IBE and other exponent-inversion IBEs due to their reliance on the strong
BDHI assumption, and that BB1-IBE and BF-IBE both are good, but BB1-IBE can be a better choice due to
BF-IBE’s less efﬁcient encryption.
Table 1 provides a detailed operation count and key size comparison of our three distributed PKGs.
We count DKG-Sh instances, pairings, NIZKPKs, interpolations and public and private key sizes. We
24leave aside the comparatively small exponentiations and other group operations. As mentioned in §5.5, for
BB1-IBE, with curves of type 1 and 2, there is a choice that can be made between using n NIZKPKs and
2n pairing computations. The table shows the NIZKPK choice (the only option for type 3 pairings), and
footnote b shows where NIZKPKs can be traded off for pairings. As discussed in §5.3, for curves with type
2 pairings, an efﬁcient algorithm for hash-to-ˆ G is not available and we have to interchange the groups used
for the system public key shares and client private-key shares. Footnote c indicates how that affects the key
sizes.
In Table 1, we observe that the distributed PKGsetup and the distributed private-key extraction protocols
for BF-IBE are signiﬁcantly more efﬁcient than those for SK-IBE and BB1-IBE. Importantly, for BF-IBE,
distributed PKG nodes can extract a key for a client without interacting with each other, which is not possible
in the other two schemes; both BB1-IBE and SK-IBE require at least one DKG instance for every private-
key extraction; the second required instance can be batch precomputed. Therefore, for IBE applications in
the random oracle model, we suggest the use of the BF-IBE scheme, except in situations where private-key
extractions are rare and efﬁciency of the encryption step is critical to the system. For such applications, we
suggest BB1-IBE as the small efﬁciency gains in the distributed PKG setup and extraction protocols of SK-
IBE do not well compensate for the strong security assumption required. BB1-IBE is also more suitable for
type 2 and 3 pairings, where an efﬁcient map-to-group hash function H1 is not available. Further, BB1-IBE
can also be proved secure in the standard model with selective-identity attacks. For applications demanding
security in the standard model, our distributed PKG for BB1-IBE also provides a solution to the key escrow
and single point of failure problems, using pairings of type 1 or 2.
6.3 Proactive Security and Group Modiﬁcation
With an endless supply of software and network security ﬂaws, system attacks not only are prevalent but
have also been growing. The distributed nature of our protocols mitigates the effects of those attacks to some
extent, but their time-independence makes them vulnerable to a gradual break-in by a mobile attacker break-
ing into system nodes one by one. The concept of proactive security [51] has been introduced to counter
these attacks. Further, on a long-term basis, the set of PKG nodes will need to be modiﬁed, which can also
cause changes to the system’s security threshold t and the crash-limit f. Therefore, for our distributed PKG
systems, we need proactive security and group modiﬁcation protocols.
We observe that the proactive security and group modiﬁcation protocols deﬁned in [42], for the DKG
protocol used in our distributed PKGs, are directly applicable to our distributed PKGs. We suggest the use
of these protocols to achieve proactive security of our master keys and group modiﬁcation of our PKGs.
Note that this is possible only due to the nature of the master keys for the three IBE schemes that we use.
All master key elements in these three schemes belong to Zp, which is also the output domain for the DKG
protocol. In contrast to the three IBEs that we consider, we leave as an open problem the possibility of
providing proactive security and group modiﬁcation protocols to the master keys for IBE schemes such as
the original BB1-IBE [9] or Waters’ IBE [62].
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we designed and compared distributed PKG setup and private key extraction protocols for
Boneh and Franklin’s BF-IBE, Sakai and Kasahara’s SK-IBE, and Boneh and Boyen’s BB1-IBE. We ob-
served that the distributed PKG implementation for BF-IBE is the most simple and efﬁcient among all and
we suggest its use when the system can support its relatively costly encryption step. For systems requiring
a faster encryption, we suggest the use of BB1-IBE instead. However, during every distributed private key
extraction, it requires a DKG and consequently, interaction among PKG nodes. That being said, during
25private-key extractions, we successfully avoid any interaction between clients and PKG nodes except the
necessary identity at the start and key share transfers at the end. Further, each of the above three schemes
represents a separate category of IBE schemes and our designs can be applied to other schemes in those
categories as well.
While developing our distributed PKGs, we also developed asynchronous computational protocols for
distributed multiplication and distributed inverse computation, which may have their own applications. To
conﬁrm the feasibility of a distributed PKG in the asynchronous communication model, we also imple-
mented and veriﬁed the efﬁciency and the reliability of an asynchronous DKG protocol using extensive
testing over the PlanetLab platform. We also suggested proactive security and group modiﬁcation protocols
for our distributed PKGs. In the future, we would like add those features to our implementation.
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A Non-interactive Zero-knowledge Proofs
We now present the details of the non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (NIZKPKs) intro-
duced in §4.2. Here, H is a hash function modelled by a random oracle.
The ﬁrst proof is that a Feldman commitment F = C g (s) = gs and a Pedersen commitment P =
C g,h (s,r) = gshr are both committing to the same value s. We denote this by NIZKPK≡Com(s,r,F,P).
The proof is equivalent to zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge used by Canetti et al. in their adaptive
secure DKG [16].
The proof is generated as follows:
• Pick v1,v2 ∈R Zp
• Let t1 = gv1, t2 = hv2
• Let τ = H(g,h,F,P,t1,t2)
• Let u1 = v1 − τ   s (mod p), u2 = v2 − τ   r (mod p)
• The proof is π≡Com = (τ,u1,u2)
The veriﬁer checks this proof (given π≡Com, g, h, F, P) as follows:
• Let t′
1 = gu1Fτ, t′
2 = hu2(P/F)τ
• Accept the proof as valid if τ = H(g,h,F,P,t′
1,t′
2)
The second proof is that two Feldman commitments F1 = C g (s) = gs and F2 = C h (s) = hs commit
to the same value; that is, the discrete logs of F1 and F2 to the bases of g and h respectively are equal. We
denote this by NIZKPK≡DLog(s,F1,F2). The proof is standard [20]:
The proof is generated as follows:
• Pick v ∈R Zp
• Let t1 = gv, t2 = hv
• Let τ = H(g,h,F1,F2,t1,t2)
• Let u = v − τ   s (mod p)
• The proof is π≡DLog = (τ,u)
The veriﬁer checks this proof (given π≡DLog, g, h, F1, F2) as follows:
• Let t′
1 = guFτ
1 , t′
2 = huFτ
2
• Accept the proof as valid if τ = H(g,h,F1,F2,t′
1,t′
2)
29Algorithm for Simulator S
Let B be the set of parties controlled by the adversary, and G be the set of honest parties (run by the simulator). Without loss
of generality, B = [P1,Pt′] and G = [Pt′+1,Pn], where t
′ ≤ t. Let Y ∈ G be the input public key and H : G
6 → Zp is a
random oracle hash table for NIZKPK≡Com.
1. Perform all steps on behalf of the uncorrupted parties Pt′+1,...,Pn exactly as in the DKG protocol until the DKG-
completed message. Once a node is ready to sent the DKG-completed message, the following holds:
• Set Q is well deﬁned with at least one honest node in it.
• The adversary’s view consists of polynomials φ
(j)(x,y) for j ∈ B, the share polynomials a
(i)
j y = φ
(i)(j,y)
for Pi ∈ Q, Pj ∈ B, and commitments Ci for Pi ∈ Q.
• S knows all polynomials φ
(i)(x,y) for Pi ∈ Q as it knows n − t
′ shares for each of those.
2. Perform the following computations for each i ∈ [t + 1,n] before starting Step 6:
(a) Compute s
′
j for Pj ∈ [1,n] and sj for Pj ∈ B. Interpolate (in exponent) (0,Y ) and (j,g
sj) for j ∈ [1,t] to
compute C g (s
∗
i) = g
s∗
i .
(b) Compute the corresponding NIZKPK≡Com by generating random challenge ci ∈R Zp and responses
ui,1,ui,2 ∈R Zp, computing the commitments ti,1 = (g
s∗
i )
cig
ui,1 and ti,2 =
C g,h (si,ri)
C g (s∗
i )
ci
h
ui,2 and include
entry  (g,h,C g (s
∗
i),C g,h (si,ri),ti,1,ti,2),ci  in the hash table H so that π≡Comn = (ci,ui,1,ui,2).
3. In the end, s =
P
Pi∈Q αi such that Y = g
s.
Figure 2: Simulator for DKG with the uniform randomness property
B Uniform Randomness of The Shared Secret
B.1 Correctness
We need to prove the following three properties.
1. There is an efﬁcient algorithm that on input shares from 2t + 1 nodes and the public information
produced by the DKG protocol, output the same unique value s, even if up to t shares are submitted
by malicious nodes.
2. At the end of Sh phase of DKGPed, all honest nodes have the same value of public key Y = gs,
where s the unique secret guaranteed above.
3. s and Y are uniformly distributed in Zp and G respectively.
The ﬁrst two properties are the same as those in DKGFeld and we only need to prove the third property.
Here, s =
P
Pi∈Q αi. As long as there is one value αi in this sum that is chosen at random and
independently from the other values in the sum, the uniform distribution of s is guaranteed. All αi values
are only available in the form a Pedersen commitment until set Q is ﬁnalized. From Theorem 4.4 of [53],
in VSS using the Pedersen commitments, the view of the t-limited adversary is independent of the shared
secret. Therefore, with at least one VSS from the honest nodes in the t + 1 chosen VSSs, s is uniformly
distributed and so is Y = gs.
B.2 Secrecy
We need to prove that no information about s can be learned by the adversary except for what is implied by
Y = gs. More formally, we prove that for every PPT adversary A that has up to t nodes, there exists a PPT
simulator S that on input Y ∈ G produces an output distribution which is polynomially indistinguishable
30from A’s view of a run of the DKG protocol that ends with Y as its public key. Our proof is based on the
proof of secrecy in [35, Section 4.3].
In Figure 2, we describe the simulator S for our DKG protocol. An informal description is as follows.
S runs a DKG instance on behalf of all honest nodes. For the most of the protocol (until message DKG-
completed is to be sent), it follows the protocol DKG as instructed. For DKG-completed messages, it
changes the public key shares Yi = gsi to “hit” the desired public key Y . S knows all gsj and g
s′
j values
for all Pj ∈ B, as it chooses φ(j)(x,y) for good nodes and has received enough shares from bad nodes to
reconstruct the bivariate polynomials shared by them. For i ∈ [t + 1,n], S sets gs∗
i as interpolation (in
exponent) of (0,Y ) and (j,gsj) for j ∈ [1,t]. It creates the corresponding NIZKPK≡Com using the random
oracle hash table.
We show that the view of the adversary A that interacts with S on input Y is the same as the view of
A that interacts with the honest nodes in a regular run of the protocol that outputs the given Y as the public
key.
In a regular run of protocol DKG, A sees the following probability distribution of data produced by the
honest nodes:
• Values φi(j,y), φ′
i(j,y) for i ∈ G,j ∈ B, uniformly chosen in Zp
• Values Ci and gsi for Pi ∈ G, that correspond to randomly chosen polynomials.
As we are interested in runs of DKG that end with Y as the public key, we note that the above distribution
of values is induced by the choice (of the good parties) of polynomials φi(x,y), φ′
i(x,y) for Pi ∈ Q,
uniformly distributed in the family of t-degree polynomials over Zp such that
Q
Pi∈Q gφi(0,0) = Y . Without
loss of generality, assume Pn ∈ G belongs to Q. The above distribution is characterized by the choice
of polynomials φi(x,y), φ∗
i(x,y) for Pi ∈ (G ∩ Q) − {Pn} as random independent t-degree bivariate
polynomials over Zp and of φn(x,y) as a uniformly chosen polynomial from the family of t-degree bivariate
polynomials over Zp that satisfy the constraint φn(0,0) = s −
P
Pi∈Q\{n} φi(0,0).
We show that the simulator S outputs a probability distribution which is identical to the above distri-
bution. First note that the above distribution depends on the set Q decided as the broadcast by the current
leader is complete. Since all actions of the simulator until Q is (eventually) delivered to all nodes are iden-
tical to the actions of honest parties interacting with A in a real run of the protocol, we are assured that the
set Q deﬁned in this simulation is identical to its value in the real protocol.
We now describe the output distribution of S in terms of t-degree bivariate polynomials φ∗
i correspond-
ing to the choices of the simulator. It is deﬁned as follows: For Pi ∈ (Q − B − {Pn}), set φ∗
i to φi and
φ′∗
i to φ′
i. Deﬁne φ∗
n such that the values φ∗
n(0,0) = logg( Y
Q
j∈(Q−B−{Pn}) g
α∗
j ) and φ∗
n(j,y) = φn(j,y)
for j ∈ [1,t]. Finally, deﬁne φ′∗
n(x,y) such that φ∗
n(x,y) + Λφ′∗
n(x,y) = φn(x,y) + Λφ′
n(x,y), where
Λ = logg(h). It can be seen by this deﬁnition that the univariate polynomial evaluations of these polyno-
mials evaluated at the indices for Pj ∈ B coincide with the values φi(j,y) which are seen by the corrupted
parties in the protocol. Note that the above DLog values φ∗
n(0,0) and φ′
n
∗(0,0) are unknown to the simula-
tor. Also, the commitments of these polynomials agree with Ci published by the simulated honest parties in
the protocol as well as with the exponentials gs∗
i for Pi ∈ G published by the simulator at the end on behalf
of the honest parties. Thus, these values pass the veriﬁcations in the real protocol.
It remains to be shown that polynomials φ∗
i and φ′∗
i belong to the right distribution. Indeed, for Q −
G − {Pn} this is immediate since they are deﬁned identically to φi which are chosen according to the
uniform distribution. For φ∗
n we see that this polynomial evaluates in points j = [1,t] to random values
(φn(j,y)) while at 0 it evaluates logg(gα∗
n) as required to hit Y . Finally, φ′∗
n is deﬁned as φ′∗
n(x,y) =
Λ−1(φn(x,y) − φ∗
n(x,y) + φ′
n(x,y)) and since φ′∗
n(x,y) is random and independent then so is φ′∗
n(x,y).
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